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PROJECT OVERVIEW
Plamen Ralchev
Security Challenges and Development of Southern Balkans Project
addressed a number of pressing issues arising from the institutional
collapse and series of security crises in this part of the Balkans. The
main goal of the project was to involve outstanding think tanks from
Bulgaria (Institute for Regional and International Studies), Macedonia
(Euro-Balkan Institute) and Albania (Institute for Contemporary
Studies) in active networking for promotion of common measures to
sustain stability and security in Southern Balkans.
The initial concept of the project was explicitly focused on early
warning and conflict prevention. Considering these project objectives,
the first stage of the project envisaged risk assessment of security
challenges in Bulgaria, Macedonia and Albania. The conducted
research activities were aimed at identifying the risk potential and
evaluating the most likely scenarios for Bulgaria, Macedonia and
Albania and their interaction. To this end, several clusters of indicators
have been estimated and distinguished trends were pointed out.
The second stage of the project was organizing National Work-
shops in the three countries in focus. The purpose of the National
Workshops was to examine and revise the preliminary country report
by involving national experts on ethnic issues, infrastructure projects
and security issues (political, military, organized crime) and providing
a local policy forum for searching better formulation of the country
report on security issues.
The conflict developments in the Republic of Macedonia since
February 2001 however dramatically altered the environment in which
the project was supposed to take place. Being specially concerned with
the situation in the region, the very concept of the project had to be
reconsidered. The notion of early warning and conflict prevention was
modified and evolved into the notion of conflict management and
conflict regulation. Due to these force majeur circumstances the
agenda of project activities was also revised. The deteriorated situation
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required crisis assessment and regulation to which we wished to
contribute with our project.
Taking into consideration the escalation of tension in the Republic
of Macedonia from March 2001, the Institute for Regional and
International Studies initiated, organized and conducted, within the
framework of this project, a separate and independent initiative called
International Fact-finding Mission to the Republic of Macedonia.
From April 23 to 29, 2001 a delegation of prominent experts
and opinion leaders from Southeastern Europe, the EU and the USA
was on a seven-day fact-finding mission to the Republic of Macedonia.
The mission was supported by the Regional Networking Project,
sponsored by Freedom House, with funding provided by the U.S.
Agency for International Development.
The International Fact-finding Mission had been an extension
of the Project on Security Challenges and Development of the Southern
Balkans. The mission was organizationally and technically assisted by
FORUM-CSRD, Skopje. The European Integration and Regional
Stability Program of the Open Society Foundation-Sofia, provided
support to follow-up activities of the International Fact-finding Mis-
sion.
The international fact-finding mission aimed at evaluating the
situation in Macedonia following the crisis in the country from March
2001. In pursuit of this goal contacts were established and interviews
were conducted with representatives of various institutions, political
leaders and civic activists in the Republic of Macedonia. A report
was drafted, outlying the current problems and suggesting a set of
recommendations for improving the interethnic relations and the
security situation in the country.
From April 23 to 27, 2001 the members of the mission met with
representatives of Macedonias political elite and civic activists. On
a workshop on April 28 and 29, mission participants discussed the
framework of the missions report. The first draft of the missions
recommendations was presented at a regional conference on European
Multi-ethnic Macedonia versus Another Balkan Scenario, organized
in Ohrid by the Euro-Balkan Institute, Skopje.
On July 28 and 29 in Ohrid, Macedonia the first regional
conference was held. The crisis had been flaring up again and the
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next round of talks between Macedonian and ethnic Albanian leaders
had been under way. At this background the conference contributed
to the attempts for facilitating the interethnic dialogue. As one of the
participants has stated the conference provided one of the few forums
where Macedonians and ethnic Albanians met to discuss problems of
common concern apart from the political dialogue held in the country
under the auspices of the President Trajkovski. A very active debate
has been initiated on two major topics:
q  Military-political security in the Balkans after Kosovo
q  Identification of the nature and possible solutions to the
Macedonian crisis.
On 26 and 27 September 2001 the second regional conference
within the framework of the project took place in Sofia. The two days
of plenary sessions involved prominent experts from the three countries
in active debate on the following issues:
q  Soft security challenges in the Southern Balkans
l  Overview of the crisis management in Macedonia;
l  Armed resistance and terrorism;
l  Organized crime activities: drug trafficking, human traf-
ficking, corruption and arms trade
q  Development issues
l  Physical infrastructure development
l  Transborder cooperation at national and local level.
The two regional forums highlighted and emphasized the major
security and development concerns related to the project countries. The
security situation and conflict management in Macedonia have been
considered of crucial importance for the forthcoming development of
the region. Another issue of concern is the integration of the organized
crime networks throughout the region.
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CHAPTER I
SECURITY THREATS PERCEPTIONS
Marin Lessenski, Antonina Arbova, Plamen Ralchev
Dritan Shano, Maciej Kaczorowski
As explained above, the project took place in two different types of
environment  early warning and conflict management. Within the
early warning phase a set of security threats perceptions has been
elaborated in Bulgaria, Macedonia and Albania.
Research on security risks has been conducted in the three project
countries by involving national experts on ethnic issues, infrastructure
projects and security issues (political, military, organized crime) and
providing a local policy forum for searching better formulation of key
security risks.
SECURITY THREATS PERCEPTIONS:
AN OUTLOOK FROM BULGARIA
The practical implications of the conducted research and analyses as
well as the discussion held at the National Workshop and its
contribution to the project development refer to the precise and clear
definition of the security risks for Bulgaria. The experts esteems
pointed out two types of dangers: external and internal.
The zones of tension in Kosovo and Southern Serbia, and the
eventual spilling over of this conflict towards the Republic of
Macedonia, Albania, Sandjak and Montenegro are considered as
external risks.
The internal risks refer to the economic viability and stability
of the country and also to its social and demographic problems.
A matter of common concern (of all the countries in the region)
is the organized crime activities, which necessitate collective approach
to combating it.
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Infrastructure development and modernization is also considered
as a topic of common interest. In this context, infrastructure projects
are viewed as a long term mean for instigating and advancing regional
dialogue and cooperation, thus abolishing old stereotypes, improving
perceptions and, as an ultimate goal, overcoming regional backward-
ness.
POLITICAL FACTORS FOR STABILITY
In regard to the political factors for stability it should be pointed out
that there are two types of factors  internal and external.
The internal factors for the Bulgarian national interest deal with
the shrinking confidence in institutions and political parties. One of
the leading concerns is the party-led way of thinking and partisan
approach towards institution building. The intensified criminalization
in the country along with weak institution structure make up a quite
dangerous symbiosis challenging security. Having in mind the per-
spective of recent general elections and their outcome it is worth
considering the forthcoming restructuring of the political environment
in the country and the possible policies that could be pursued by the
new government. This topic refers to the political formula of the future
government and especially to reaching domestic consensus among
political parties on foreign policy priorities.
The external factors are focused on the level and balance of
international community (NATO and EU) involvement in the region
and on the way the Kosovo issue will be tackled with. The status
of Kosovo is still uncertain but it will doubtlessly have direct
implications on the other countries in the region and on the Republic
of Macedonia and Albania in particular. The Albanian Question
refers to how Albanians in Kosovo are going to behave and what stand
they will have towards Yugoslavia, Albania and Macedonia. It also
relates to the ethnic balance in Macedonia which being quite fragile
would hardly be maintained. All this spectrum of external factors poses
substantial threats to stability and security in the region.
Even symbolic US withdrawal from the region would lead to
losing control over a number of regional factors as well as imbalance
of international strategy towards the region. Meanwhile, the interests
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of Russia grow stronger and appear as alternative to the international
community interests. Yet more hazardous would be if the EU does
not persist an integrated stand and interests and undertakes a series
of opportunistic and compromise measures by European factors to
temporary and not ultimate resolution of the problems in the region.
The inappropriate consideration and approach to this issue could easily
predispose the spread of security vacuum in the region.
The Bulgarian national interest requires elaborating and applying
a long-term strategy of how Bulgaria will behave in the region. The
key notion is that stability is to be perceived as a consequence of
not changing the borders. The second notion is that Republic of
Macedonia is highly likely to enter a period of destabilization in two
ways  either by evolution through demographic boom of the Albanian
population there, or by radical nationalistic Albanian actions. Therefore
an essential part of the long-term strategy has to be the way the young
active and dynamic Albanian nationalism will be contained and what
balances for containing the Albanian factor will be established.
ECONOMIC FACTORS FOR STABILITY
Economic factors have intricate impact on security as far as they affect
the abilities of nations and states to survive and develop. The basic
economic problems that Bulgaria faces during the last years concern
the macro- and microeconomic stabilization of the country.
There is a striking contradiction between macro- and micro-
economic performance of Bulgaria. At macro level after years of
applying inconsistent economic policies Bulgaria suffered two eco-
nomic crises as it has been stated in the country report - in 1991
and 1996/1997. With the assistance of IMF in 1997 a Currency Board
was introduced and a gradual process of economic improvement has
been commenced. These efforts led to a relative success since the
country was financially stabilized  no more cases of rampant
fluctuation of exchange rates, interest rates and prices. The Central
Bank, though its limited activities, succeeded in accumulating more
foreign exchange reserves.
Despite the achievements, the economic policy pursued after 1997
proved to have some definite shortcomings. They are most tangible
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at microeconomic level referring to households and enterprises. The
IMF assistance and governmental policies failed to counteract the
impoverishment of people and the unemployment in the country arisen
as consequences of structural reforms. These reforms in Bulgaria
attained negative sense because the greater part of previously state-
owned enterprises that have been privatized in recent years did not
start working efficiently and eventually were closed down. Immediate
sequence of this is the flourishing of unemployment.
Behind the official unemployment figure of 18.54 % (708 730
unemployed people) there is a much higher unofficial figure. It is partly
due to the number of workers fired from the privatized companies
as well as to the number of employed people in the gray economy.
According to Trade Unions data unemployment exceeds 30 % and
about 75 % of the population live in poverty. 300 000 people have
been fired only in 2000. Yet there are some regions in the country
where the unemployment rate is more than 50 %. Another negative
tendency is that each 7th unemployed person is up to 24 years of age.
Some of the so-called strategic investments in key sectors of
Bulgarian economy did not prove to be effective either (a good
example in this regard is the current status of Balkan Airlines
Company). The government did not cushion these inevitable negative
effects of reforms neither did stimulate free private enterprise.
Pension, Social security and Health care reforms constitute a
substantial part of structural reforms conducted in Bulgaria. This part
of the reforms concerns the new legislative regulations and practices
in the spheres of pensions and social security systems. The health
care reform intends separating this sphere from the state budget.
Though considered of ultimate necessity, this type of reforms brings
about entirely new patterns of organization which, being sometimes
misunderstood and improperly applied, intricate tension and uproar.
Banking system was badly affected by the financial crisis in 1996
 1997. Many banks due to extensive loans and credits suffered capital
inadequacy and insolvency and finally went bankrupt. Consequently,
the banking sector still finds it difficult to recover, to regain the trust
and savings of individuals and business. Some of the big banks were
sold out to foreign investors who started renovation and modernization
but still this sector has a long way to go in respect of quality and
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variety of services. The banking services require intensive interaction
between Bulgarian and foreign banks. The regional perspective of this
interaction is quite asymmetric. For example, Greece and Turkey
expand their banking activities in the region, but there are no reciprocal
actions on behalf of other countries. Unless such kind of neighboring
countries banks representation is established the notion of intensifying
economic contacts within the region will keep sounding ridiculous
while illegal transfers of capitals will flourish.
Taxation policy and administration is an issue of special concern
because of the fiscal discipline required by the Currency Board.
Despite the efforts for strengthening taxation control the notorious
practices of evading paying taxes continue. It refers to both personal
incomes and business activities. Evading paying taxes is partly due
to the gray sector of economy, involving, according to experts
esteem, about 40 % of the population in the country. The gray
economic activities badly affect the national economy as a whole and
deprive the state budget of substantial funds.
Considering the foreign debt service, the financial standing of
Bulgaria is likely to deteriorate within 2-3 years because it will be
burdened with starting paying off the principal of the foreign debt.
On the background of reduced financial assistance of IMF it will
seriously challenge the economic stability of the country.
One of the pressing economic concerns is how to provide GDP
growth. Bulgaria cannot record an increase in GDP for a number of
reasons. If analyzing in brief the GDP composition assuming the so-
called cost approach to the GDP the main components to be considered
are Consumption of goods and services, Government spending,
Investments and Net export (i.e. Export  Import).
Dwelling on each of the variables on the case of Bulgaria it could
easily become evident why no real increase in GDP is recorded. Due
to the lack of competitive advantages Bulgaria frequently suffers a
nil or a deficit in its trade balance. Though the slow, but steady, growth
in Direct Foreign Investments (1.1 billion USD in 2000) there are little
domestic investments and shortage of investment funds and sources
within the country. The insufficient capital resources are additionally
discouraged by the low interest rate and therefore they are being
invested abroad. The government expenditures are subject to con-
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straints and fiscal restrictions owing to the Currency Board regulations.
So, the most significant contributor to the GDP is Consumption
of goods and services. Since, however, the Personal Disposable Income
in Bulgaria is low, the considerable part of it is being spent on food
and goods of primary necessity rather than being saved or invested.
The outlined characteristics of Bulgarias GDP composition reveal
the troubled economic and business climate in the country. The main
problems in this sphere refers to the adverse balance of trade, small
share of investment goods, the inefficient functioning of the banking
system, the structural reforms completion, gray economy activities, etc.
Though macroeconomic indicators for the last two years mark some
positive trends, social conditions and microeconomic environment are
still getting worse. Therefore they should be considered as risk
potential as far as social tensions could easily incite domestic, intra-
state conflicts.
DEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS FOR STABILITY
The demographic situation in the country is highly deteriorated. There
is a distinguished tendency of diminishing the number of population.
Several key reasons for this could be pointed out  emigration, lower
birth rate and higher death rate.
The process of emigration going under way ever since the changes
in 1989 started. The Census that is in progress now is expected to
present precise data, but according to preliminary estimates from 1986
on about 700 000 people have emigrated. The vast majority of the
emigrants are young people (75 % of them are young men, thus
affecting the military reserves) who have been discouraged by the
political, social and economic problems in the country.
There are two main reasons for the lower birth rate in the country.
It is partly due to the emigrants who are predominantly people at fertile
age. Besides that, the young people who have stayed in the country
meet quite many difficulties of social and economic character. The
lower birth rate is complemented by higher death rate which is the
third factor deteriorating the demographic situation. Efficient ap-
proaches for addressing the so outlined demographic collapse are badly
needed.
SECURITY CHALLENGES AND DEVELOPMENT OF SOUTHERN BALKANS14
The process of migration from villages to towns aggravated, as
higher concentration of people occurred in two  three big cities.
People were forced to move by social and economic circumstances,
mainly the shrinkage of economic activities in the country  industry
collapsed and although some plants were privatized the unemployment
rate remained high. The concentration of too many people in big cities
rises up considerably the risk potential for performing a variety of
crime activities.
Quite persistently uninhabited territories in the country emerge,
especially in border areas. This directly reflects on the countrys
capabilities for territorial defense.
ETHNIC FACTORS FOR STABILITY
The composition of the population in Bulgaria is homogenous and
there are about twenty-two minorities living in Bulgaria. The two major
minority ethnic groups are the Turkish and Roma population.
The Roma ethnic group is dispersed throughout the country while
the Turkish ethnic group is concentrated in two main regions  in
Northeast Bulgaria and in the eastern part of the Rhodope Mountains.
The Turkish ethnic group is politically represented by the
Movement for Rights and Freedoms at both local (municipalities) and
national levels (parliament). The Roma ethnic group has no distin-
guished political representation though it recently established several
political formations.
There have been no rivalries of the ethnic groups. Ethnic tensions
may emerge on the basis of poor social and economic conditions, as
Roma and Muslim population is in their greater part unemployed. Last
year, Bulgaria was accused by the Bulgarian Helsinki Committee and
political parties in the Republic of Macedonia of violating minority
rights after the Constitutional Court decision banned OMO-Ilinden
Pirin party. OMO-Ilinden party was indicted of breaching the Con-
stitution of Bulgaria, which prohibits the establishment of parties on
ethnic or religious basis, aimed at violating the territorial integrity of
the country.
Bulgarian is the official language in all public services, though
education and communication in mother tongue is allowed.
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The ethnic groups have greater access to local institutions of
power, such as municipal authorities, and limited access to national
institutions of power (except for Parliament).
Considering the potential for ethnic unrest it should be pointed
out that it is mostly of social character. The unemployment rate among
the ethnic groups is considerably higher than the country average. For
example, in 1999 in districts of Razgrad, Turgovishte and Shumen
(where the Turkish minority group is concentrated) the unemployment
rate was 22.94 %, 26.20 % and 19.03 %, respectively, and exceeded
the country average rate of 13.79 %. Besides that, there are persistent
problems in selling the tobacco crop, which makes the living of the
Turkish ethnic group.
In terms of ethnic factors for security the key notion emerged
to be integrating minorities and not encapsulating them. There would
be a potential threat if a country tries to induce irredentist claims
within its minority in the neighboring country. Therefore it is
considered perilous to grant collective rights to ethnic minorities thus
encouraging their search for autonomy. The more appropriate approach
would be creating conditions for integrating minorities on the basis
of civil rights and fostering institutions that are to guarantee them.
That is how minorities could play the role of inter-state links
narrowing and bridging the previous gaps in the inter-state relations.
MILITARY FACTORS FOR STABILITY
The traditional military threats for security have diminished over the
last years. The newly emerged threats refer to ethnic and intra-state
conflicts, and spill-over crises. All these threats require preventive
instruments rather than forcible and coercive actions.
Internal factors - In 1998 the Bulgarian government elabo-
rated and adopted a new national military doctrine outlining the
main principles and mechanisms ensuring national security. It
assumes the collective approach to security and defines the coop-
eration and the eventual accession to NATO and EU as a strategic
priority of guaranteeing national security and defense. In this
respect, the conducting of military reforms is mainly aiming at
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unifying with NATO standards and achieving complete operative
compatibility.
In the context of the possible NATO membership, the military
doctrine emphasizes on the participation in regional and European
security systems as a major instrument for guaranteeing national
security.  It envisages military personnel to be reduced to 45 000
people, while increasing the effectiveness and efficiency of the armed
forces. The newly elaborated doctrine as well as the up-to-now
implementation of the military reform provoke some concerns:
1. The foreseen modernization and renovation of the Bulgarian
military forces seems a little bit vague and unrealistic: the existing
weapons and techniques are quite old and need overhaul; at the
same time, the country does not possess the necessary resources
for buying new weapons compatible with western standards. In
both cases, the quick and harmless rearming seems unrealistic
because it requires a lot of resources, which the country does not
dispose of.
2. According to the reform strategy the territorial defense is a
leading principle in the overall defense system. However, signifi-
cant parts of the Bulgarias border areas are progressively being
depopulated.
3. Beyond the context of NATO membership, however, the aimed
numbers and norms that are to be achieved question the importance
of Bulgarian military forces as a significant regional military factor.
The foreseen structure and strength of the Bulgarian military forces
does and will further bring about significant asymmetry on the
Balkans regarding the military potential of the major neighboring
countries (Turkey, Greece, and Yugoslavia). In comparison to the
neighbor countries military indicators, Bulgaria loses its attrac-
tiveness, diminishing its chances for NATO membership.
4. The national military doctrine pays special attention to the
exercising of civil control over the armed forces and the imple-
mentation of the military reforms. However, till now, the civic
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participation is demonstrated mainly through employing civilians
in the military structures, mostly on central administrative level,
rather than through the establishment of working mechanisms for
civic participation and monitoring over the ongoing reforms in the
armed forces. There is an institutional control but no civic
assessment of the processes within the armed structures.
External factors - The traditional military threats to security have
been seriously diminished. At the same time, some new security threats
emerged: ethnic and religious conflicts, religious fundamentalism,
military separatism, proliferation of mass destruction weapons; inter-
national terrorism, organized crime, trafficking in drugs, arms and
peoples, illegal transfer of high technologies.
1. The major threat for Bulgaria to be involved into a military crisis
derives from the possibility for a spill over of a military or armed
conflict in a neighboring country.  For the present, the still
unfinished disintegration processes in Yugoslavia - the develop-
ments in Southern Serbia, as well as their implications on Republic
of Macedonia, in particular - turn out to be the greatest military/
security challenge in front of Bulgaria. Possible destabilization of
Republic of Macedonia as well as subsequent refugee flows would
seriously challenge countrys security and stability. This issue
imposes the necessity of working out a long-term policy strategy
including Bulgarias clear stand on the processes going underway
westward from Bulgaria and defining the role of the country in
the Balkan region.
2. Any, even symbolic, US military withdrawal from the Balkans
would result in unbalancing of the international presence in the
Balkans. This would create security vacuum in the region affecting
stability and development of all Balkan countries as well as the
entire Balkan security system. On the other side, potential dis-
integration of the EU interests in the region would not only
unbalance the international strategy towards the region but would
also provoke disputes and series of opportunistic steps aiming at
freezing rather than resolving the existing problems.
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3. The collective approach to security as well as conducting joint
peace keeping missions are seen as a way for overcoming the
asymmetry of power in the region and the eventual less-involve-
ment of external factors such as the US. The participation in joint
missions in troubled areas in the region (Kosovo, Southern Serbia)
as compensation of the strategic security vacuum that is likely to
appear, however, provokes some concerns:
l   If the participation in such peacekeeping operations is estimated
as a test for applicant countries operative readiness to become
NATO members, then, it is of extreme importance to carefully
assess Bulgarias potential and experience in acting properly
in such context.
l  The effectiveness of a peacekeeping mission including soldiers
from the Balkan neighbors of the protectorate areas could be
seriously challenged by some particular historical feelings and
attitudes.
ORGANIZED CRIME IMPACT ON STABILITY
Organized crime activities pose substantial threat to Bulgaria and
the region as a whole. In the last few years, the Bulgarian government
has taken a lot of measures aiming at fighting those negative trends.
The present situation, however, shows that those actions were not
sufficient to curb crime and corruption. They were mainly short-
term superficial, campaign measures rather than integral parts of an
overall in-depth strategy. Moreover, there is a general belief that the
political elite prefers to negotiate with crime groups instead of
fighting them.
Drug trafficking is one of the major threats when talking about
organized crime implication on security system. It is of extreme
importance that Bulgaria is directly on the path of the drug channels
from Afghanistan to Western Europe. Moreover, data indicate that
there is an over-production of heroin in Afghanistan (proved by the
increased number of drugs captured by the Bulgarian customs
officers), which directly increase the quantity of drugs circulating in
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Bulgaria as well as the number of the drug-addicts. The following
going down of the prices creates a lucrative market that is worth
fighting for and irritates the criminal structures in the country. Most
of the last serious incidents are interpreted as a result of the ongoing
struggle for redistribution of the drug market in Bulgaria.
The strained criminal environment is additionally aggravated by
the publicized doubts that some relations exist between political
structures and crime groups. The former helps the latter to legalize
their business, while the latter contributes to the political organizations
financing. The weak and ineffective institutions, including the highly
politicized, non-productive and badly organized justice system, the
lack of transparent procedures accurately regulating the mechanisms
for doing business, and the developed corruption practices furthermore
threaten countrys security situation.
The major threat for the security of each of the Balkan
countries as well as for the regional security, in general, are the
well-developed transborder smuggling channels and the networking
of the organized criminal groups from these countries. Currently,
the dominant factor is the Mafia of Albanian-clan origin - the
Kosovar Mafia, in particular- that has undertaken the control over
the drug trafficking on the Balkan route. The lack of any institutions,
no police, no political system in Kosovo creates the most favorable
conditions for the criminal groups to develop their activities i.e.
trafficking in drugs, arms, cigarettes, unlicensed CDs, stolen cars,
human beings trafficking - a process including criminal gangs from
all Balkan countries.
The decentralization of criminal factors in Serbia after political
changes commenced last year also instigates further aggravation of
criminal environment in the region because these factors got out of
control and became more self-dependent. The Serb criminal groups
/gangs/ are well-organized, even based on patriotic propaganda, and
quite experienced in the course of wars. The danger of Serb groups
is about to increase since there are stockpiled weapons (i.e. in
Republika Srpska in Bosnia and Herzegovina).
When Bulgaria is granted a more favorable EU visa status, then
it will become attractive (for all these criminal groups) connection
between the region and Europe. This necessitates the elaboration of
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a long-term strategy as well as an intense cooperation between the
authorities of the countries in the region as a prerequisite for combating
organized crime and corruption not only at national but also at regional
level.
INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT
IMPACT ON STABILITY
Developing infrastructure in Bulgaria as well as cooperating on
joint projects with neighboring countries is viewed as appropriate way
for advancing towards European integration through concerted efforts.
Further infrastructure improvement will facilitate and enhance regional
economic cooperation and intensify the involvement of the countries
in the process of stabilizing the region.
Corridor # 8 has been supported by the 4-year South Balkans
Development Initiative commenced by Clintons Administration. In
this regard, the US Trade and Development Agency has donated
technical assistance amounting to about 30 million USD for Bulgaria,
Macedonia and Albania.
The road and railway sections of Corridor # 8, though slowly,
are being under construction. The recent session of the joint Coor-
dinating Committee in January 2001 appointed a new technical and
economic study of the railroad Sofia  Skopje. On Macedonian
territory there are 55 km under construction, some of the tunnels and
bridges on the route have already been built. The further advance on
the railway section of the corridor however needs about 340 million
USD more.
The AMBO Project is at the stage of pre-investment studies. A
new electricity transmission line of 400 kV improving the energy
systems connection between Bulgaria and the Republic of Macedonia
is also under construction.
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SECURITY THREATS PERCEPTIONS:
AN OUTLOOK FROM ALBANIA
The project findings underline that Albania, Bulgaria and Macedonia
share more or less the same security-risk generating issues like
demographic collapse, thriving of organized crime, poor infrastruc-
ture, and weak institutions. Security issues are seemingly topping
the list of priorities of all Governments in the region thus efforts
are aimed at resolving these problems in the first instance. Major
emphasis is put on the necessity of building institutions that are
capable to duly exercise their duties and especially the education
of the public administration with the modern standards of perfor-
mance.
It was assumed that there exist two types of perceptions related
to the security issues in the region - of irrational enthusiasm and
continuous pessimism. They derive from two types of analyses:
l  optimistic  the situation in the region is calm and only small
ethnic problems are at stake;
l imprisoned into insecurities  we may have not military
problems because of the huge presence of NATO and UN troops
but on the other hand we dont have yet enough elements to
say that domestic problems are over.
In this context European involvement is quite problematic im-
plying that as regards the threats of soft security issues Europe may
be a helping hand to resolve them but as concerns the defense issues
its involvement is still far from being concrete. The European Union
is perceived to have a distorted political determination towards the
region, originated by the traditional geopolitical views of its member
countries.
It should be pointed out that apart from voicing out a political
commitment towards these very sensitive problems the Governments
of Bulgaria, Macedonia and Albania are not really engaged in security
issues, but only state what International Community wants to hear
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from them. Such pattern of behavior relates to the incapacity of the
Balkan political classes to become an active factor and also the
approach taken by them to obtain membership in the EU. Problems
could be resolved only by closely cooperating with each other in the
region; countries share the same passive feature when it comes to
cooperation, in the same moment when the local factor should be
predominant in addressing the soft security issues.
It is very important to distinguish the methods of addressing the
security problems: should we adopt a regional or European approach?
The Albanian discourse is that addressing security issues should
concentrate on regional efforts rather than directly linking it with
Brussels patterns of performance.
Following these arguments the focus is shifted on which are the
indicators that may be regionally dealt, without requiring interventions
from other factors. It was stated that:
l improvement of democracies in each of our countries is an
important factor, since democracies do not make war to each
other;
l   improvement of perceptions on ourselves (i.e. countries of the
region), dismantling of old myths that should start from the
media coverage of the events in the region, education systems,
political attitudes and speeches; and
l   the revision and potential change of the approach each country
has presently taken with regard to the EU integration, that is
proving more an isolationist attitude rather than helping to solve
regional problems.
This later issue of individual membership in the EU against
regional cooperation is somehow fueled by Brussels in its capacity
of being unable to do otherwise.
The regional approach has been skeptically regarded because of
the difficulties such enterprise implies. It was generally agreed that
a targeted approach rather than en-block one should be adopted to
address security related issues. Priority should be given to locally
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resolvable problems, like those falling under the definition of home
affairs such as: visa regimes and free movement of people, trade
facilitation and better and more jointly organized control on the illegal
traffic of people and goods in the region.
A major issue addressed is that our countries and Governments
should change their old concepts of sovereignty and pay special
attention to redefining the enemy concept and rewrite the old military
doctrines in the light of latest developments and the modern world
standards.
The conducted research and analyses as well as the expertise of
the participants in the National Workshop in Albania emphasized that
we are facing more domestic problems than international ones. Setting
up economies of scale in fighting crime, developing economic
exchanges and treatment of minorities in each of our countries (and
by our Governments) are the challenges and remedies to prevent
conflicts and deal with security related issues in the future  ensuring
a proportional and harmonious combination of both approaches, the
regional and European driven one, with respect to the efforts of each
individual country.
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SECURITY THREATS PERCEPTIONS:
AN OUTLOOK FROM MACEDONIA
POLITICAL FACTORS FOR STABILITY
In regard to the political factors for stability of the Republic of
Macedonia we can differentiate two types of factors: internal political
situation and outside circumstances impending the countrys stability.
However it is worth mentioning that these two factors are highly
interdependent and it is very difficult to survey the current Macedonian
policy without bearing in mind an extremely complicated situation next
to the countrys frontier.
In spite of having quite stable ruling coalition in the Macedonian
Parliament (Sobranje) the overall internal political situation could not
be described as a particularly favorable.
There is a significant parliamentary opposition complaining about
the inefficiency of the Macedonian governments policy and also a
huge part of public opinion is not satisfied with the overall political
climate in the country. Confidence in state institutions (which suffers
from lack of relevant human resources) and political parties is
shrinking, the society is divided along political (support mostly either
for ruling VMRO-DPMNE or opposing SDSM) and ethnic lines
(Macedonian majority- Albanian significant minority).
Possible inter-ethnic tensions are likely to become one of the most
serious challenges for Macedonians stability. Although representatives
of Albanian minority participate actively in countrys political life,
having their representatives in main official institutions including
ministries and high number of parliamentary members (DPA being
part of ruling coalition and opposing PDP), they still claim to be
underrepresented in public administration and their demands are
growing. The radicalization of these demands (such as change of
Macedonian constitution and creating a federal state with two
autonomous entities) could be a possible extreme threat for the stability
of Macedonia as well as for the whole region. The latest events on
Macedonian- Yugoslav border prove this, the outcome is still not
known, even the fully cooperation of Macedonian authorities with
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international community and the condemnation of that kind of radical
activities on behalf of ethnic Albanian leaders did not succeed in
calming down the situation.
The other event, which has recently really shocked Macedonian
public opinion, is the taping scandal.  It has not been cleared yet who
stays behind this affair, but one thing is sure - it influenced badly
the already fragile internal stabilization.
External factors being a real danger for Macedonians stability
are interrelated to already mentioned events on the Macedonian border
with the Province of Kosovo. We can be almost fully convinced that
Kosovo Albanians - radical representatives of former KLA, are the
men responsible for starting fighting in Southern Serbia and willing
also to spread out the conflict on Macedonian territory. The longer
Kosovo status remains undefined, the bigger is the threat of desta-
bilization of Republic of Macedonia as well as neighboring countries.
The protection of Kosovos border by KFOR should be intensified
to avoid the penetration on Macedonians territory by some armed
groups from outside. International community has to stress once again
that the stable Macedonia is a key-factor for regional security and
stability and do their best to protect the country and deter any kind
of outside menace. Long-lasting presence of NATO troops in the region
seems to be necessary for maintaining peace.
The neighboring countries should also be determined in Macedonia
remaining a stable country. Macedonian -Yugoslavian Agreement on
recognition of common border, better climate in Greek - Macedonian
dispute over the countrys official name, Bulgarian, Greek and Serbian
support for combating the terrorist acts in Macedonia and also distinct
condemnation of these acts on behalf of Albania proper are very
positive signs.
ECONOMIC FACTORS FOR STABILITY
Along with political, the economical problems are probably most
serious Macedonia has to cope with. They are possible source for
countrys instability.
The unemployment rate, which among young people is dramati-
cally high, different experts estimate it from 35 % to even over 50
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% of the entire population. Many areas of the country suffer from
structural unemployment. Although the ruling coalition promised new
job openings, it failed to realize this task. Privatization, which is
regarded to be almost completed, is mostly combined with massive
lay-off. The reform of Public Administration in Macedonia refers to
further decline of employees number. The presence of foreign
investors that could improve the situation on the labor market is still
inadequate. About 90% of direct foreign investments in Macedonia
are coming from Greece which produced a feeling of imbalance and
a fear of becoming politically dependent among big part of Macedonian
society.
About 40 % of the population live in poverty. The deficit in trade
exchange is about 600 millions DM. There are claims that IMF and
World Bank assistance didnt prove to be beneficial for Macedonian
economy. All of these could result in outbreak of social unrest.
However there still exists a kind of hope. Last November
Macedonia has signed an Agreement on Association and Stabilization
with EU and became automatically one of the candidates for EU-
membership. The international aid within the Stability Pact is promised
to be intensified. As result of democratic changes in FRY, Macedonia
along with Greece regained its most important economic partner in
the region.
In 2000 Macedonia noted a surplus of over 200 millions DM
in the state budget.
GDP growth inhibited by Kosovo crisis should amount to about
6 % in the year 2001.
Creating Free Custom Zone and further a Custom Union to
approach EU standards could solve the lack of relevant economic
cooperation with Bulgaria and Albania.
DEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS FOR STABILITY
The demographic situation in Macedonia is quite complicated. On one
hand, the number of ethnic Macedonian population is diminishing for
3 main reasons - lower birth rate, higher death rate and emigration.
On the other hand, there is notable demographic growth among
Albanian and Roma communities in Macedonia. The new Census is
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expected to be held this year, the data from the last Census held in
1994 are already outdate and probably not giving the real picture of
the demographic structure in Macedonia. Compare to results from
1994, the number of Albanian and Roma population will likely
increase.
There is also a process of mass migration from villages to towns,
mostly to the capital - Skopje. Vast areas of the country are getting
depopulated, mainly in Eastern and Central part of Macedonia. It
concerns young people, seeking better chances in bigger towns,
escaping from the lack of perspectives in their home areas.
Another potential challenge for demographic stability of Macedonia
is the process of aging within the EU. It could result in massive brain-
draining and the waste of well-qualified human resources from the
country.
ETHNIC FACTORS FOR STABILITY
The composition of the population in the Republic of Macedonia is
quite heterogeneous since, around more than 1/3 of the population
consists of minorities.
There is no municipality, which is ethnically homogenous,
although the Albanian population is concentrated mostly in the
Western part of the country. The other 2 major minorities, Roma and
Turkish are dispersed throughout the Macedonian territory.
Since becoming an independent country, there were 3 parliamen-
tary elections in Macedonia - 1990, 1994 and 1998. According to
the results, the composition of the Parliament resembles the structure
of the population regarding the bigger ethnic groups.
Since 1992 all governments in Macedonia have been coalitions
between Macedonian and Albanian parties. Other nationalities (Turks,
Roma, Vlachs) were included as well, but as parts of the Macedonian
political party terms, on a personal choice.
The access to education is equal for all citizens in all levels. The
Constitution guarantees free, primary and secondary education in
minority languages. Recently adopted Law on Higher Education allows
for private universities in minority (or other) language with Macedonian
language as a compulsory subject.
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The present relations between Macedonians and Albanians,
although rather tense, do not have roots in a historical dispute, since
traditionally the 2 groups did not have any conflict. All tensions are
a result of the present political context.
However, there is a wide net of prejudices existing among the
ethnic groups, which combined with the complicated present political
events in the region may be a further source of conflict and instability.
MILITARY FACTORS FOR STABILITY
The traditional military threats for Macedonian security have been
minimized over the last decade. The biggest danger refers to ethnic
and inter-ethnic clashes and spill-over crises. The other threats to
national peace are: the expansion of militant nationalism; uncontrol-
lable expansion and utilization of means for mass destruction;
transnational terrorism; arms, drugs and weapon trafficking.
Because of its geographic position, some forces may consider
Macedonian territory suitable for crossing by terrorist groups sup-
ported by some countries, in order to perform terrorist actions in any
third country, including actions in the Republic of Macedonia.
The country could maintain all the guarantees for its security
through the collective defense and security system. Macedonia applies
for full political and military integration with NATO Alliance.
Realizing however that it could not happen in the nearest future, the
country should support a long-lasting NATOs military presence in
the region thus avoiding creation of security vacuum which could
threaten stability of Macedonia, as well as neighboring countries.
In order to perform better its tasks, Macedonian Military Forces
should be rapidly modernized, with possible decreasing of soldiers
number. The creation of professional and efficient Army must be a
main objective regarding protection of its own borders.
INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT
IMPACT ON STABILITY
Developing infrastructure in Macedonia as well as cooperating on joint
projects with neighboring countries is viewed as appropriate way for
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advancing towards European integration through concerted efforts.
Further infrastructure improvement will facilitate and enhance regional
economic cooperation and intensify the involvement of the countries
in the process of stabilizing the region.
Corridor # 8 has been supported by the 4-year South Balkans
Development Initiative commenced by Clintons Administration. In
this regard, the US Trade and Development Agency has donated
technical assistance amounting to about 30 million USD for Macedonia,
Bulgaria and Albania.
The road and railway sections of Corridor # 8, though slowly,
are being under construction. The recent session of the joint Coor-
dinating Committee in January 2001 appointed a new technical and
economic study of the railroad Skopje  Sofia. On Macedonian
territory there are 55 km under construction, some of the tunnels and
bridges on the route have already been built. The further advance on
the railway section of the corridor however needs about 340 million
USD more.
The Corridor # 8, the AMBO Project, the energy system network
and telecommunications establish common ground for Republic of
Macedonia, Bulgaria and Albania to promote dialogue and cooperation
in this part of the region. Despite the other competing routes,
destinations and corridors, the main point in building connections
between Bulgaria, Republic of Macedonia and Albania is of compre-
hensive political value besides of its plain economic efficiency.
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CHAPTER II
ETHNIC FACTORS IMPACT
ON REGIONAL STABILITY
(A Concise Short Term Risk Assessment of Ethnic Factors as
Threatening Regional Stability in the Southern Balkans)
Dr. Lyubov Mincheva
I. INTRODUCTION
Amid all current factors posing threat to the Balkan regional stability,
the ethnic one seems to be the most serious. Factors, such as crime,
economic- and demographic development, or infrastructure- and even
military politics are, to a considerable extent, domestic concerns. In
contrast, ethnic factor in the Balkans is still a regional international
concern. This chapter aims to assess the risk of ethnic conflict in the
southern Balkans in the period following the 1999 Kosovo crisis.
Ethnic minorities of Bulgaria, Macedonia and Albania fall within
the focus of this comparative project. The ethnic minorities are
examined in view of their international and domestic conflict potential.
This project has selected to assess communal groups in view of the
groups cohesion, political representation, cultural rights and ethnic
unrest. In a bid to provide an instructive picture of regional ethnic
instability however the project first looks at the ethnic situation in
Kosovo and south Serbia.
The information gathered in this project helps us draw the
following three conclusions: 1) A major threat to the regional
international stability comes from the Kosovo province of Yugoslavia.
We suggest the following explanations: a) Kosovos status is yet to
be arranged. Simultaneously, no clarity exists of whether Kosovo will
be autonomous, independent or unified unit with ethnic Albanians
across current borders; b) Kosovo politics remains blended with
criminality and terrorism; c) Kosovos democratization is insufficient,
while Kosovos borders remain porous.
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Kosovos future status is yet unclear. Autonomy, independence,
unification with kindred lands across the border, are contesting
opportunities. Resolution 1244, which ended NATO air strikes
against Yugoslavia in June 1999, said that the international com-
munity, assuming responsibility for administering the province,
would stand for Kosovos autonomy. The resolution confirmed that
Kosovo was to remain a constituent part of Yugoslavia. Shortly after
transforming Kosovo into an international protectorate however the
Kosovars indicated that they intended to change the spirit of that
resolution. Achieving independence from Yugoslavia seemed to
have been their ultimate goal at that moment.  However, the
insurgencies of the ethnic Albanians in south Serbia in 2000 and
in Macedonia in 2001 indicated that even Kosovos independence
was not the ultimate goal. Surprising for neighbors and the
international community, the improvement of the Kosovars status
after June 1999 did not result in a pacification of the region.
Instead, we witnessed an escalation of the Albanian demands,
frequently calling for unification of Kosovo with south Serbia, parts
of Macedonia, and even parts of Greece and Montenegro.
Kosovo threatens regional stability also because its nation-
alistic politics frequently blends with criminality and terrorism.
Many of those who fought in Kosovo were seasonal insurgents
who took part in different Balkan wars. These seasonal insurgents
belong to a clan network of ethnic Albanians engaged in smug-
gling of arms, men and drugs. The insurgents look at wars as
a source of permanent employment. Kosovos leadership may not
necessarily control them in attacks performed on UN authorities
and civilians of Slavic origin.
Kosovo threatens Balkan regional stability, not least, because
the province failed the democratization attempt of the international
community. In the past two years the Kosovar Albanians, as well
as their administration, launched a retaliatory campaign on the
ethnic Serbs in the province for Milosevics ethnic oppression.
The establishment of the Kosovar democratic and civilian
institutions was sadly preceded by serious interethnic incidents
which eventually resulted in the Kosovars driving ethnic Serbs
either in enclaves, or completely out of the province.
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Kosovo threatens regional stability also because its porous
borders allow export of civil unrest in the near abroad. Concretely,
Kosovo exported rebellion, with part of the Kosovo administration
employees having taken part in the insurgencies in south Serbia
and Macedonia.
The second conclusion is that the key to assessing the regional
security system is the interethnic situation in the republic of
Macedonia. Specifically, Macedonia does not seem to be posing
threat to regional stability. However, the country remains vulnerable
to cross-border spillover activism, and domestic ethnic unrest.
A framework agreement for the enhancement of the status of
the ethnic Albanians, brokered by NATO, EU and US envoys, and
signed on 13 August 2001 by the Macedonian government and
the ethnic Albanian leadership, officially put an end to Macedonias
2001 spillover crisis. However, the leadership of the Macedonian
Albanians has not yet proven its loyalty to-, and respect for the
institutions of the Macedonian state. The leadership has failed to
distance itself from the National Liberation Army (NLA) which
sparked the 2001 Macedonian crisis. By keeping political silence
on its connections with the NLA, the ethnic Albanian political
leadership keeps the state borders open for future incursions, and
leaves an opportunity for itself to contribute to domestic ethnic
unrest.
The third conclusion is that ethnic relations in Albania are
relatively calm. However, civic peace is unstable in the country.
The precarious civic peace in Albania threatens domestic ethnic
stability and regional security.
Likewise, the forth conclusion is that ethnic relations in
Bulgaria have undergone a process of a smooth democratization.
However, economic situation is worsening while political institu-
tions are still vulnerable. These processes prevent the transforma-
tion of the Turkish ethnic party into a modern party based on
principles and ideologies. These processes also impede the countrys
fast integration into the EU and NATO and its transformation into
a stabilizing factor in the Balkans.
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II. MAJOR FINDINGS
1. Ethnic Factor from the International Perspective
Kosovo
During the examined period, beginning in June 1999 and ending
in September 2001, two regional ethnic crises occurred. One  was
the 2000 south Serbia crisis. It was brought into the Presevo valley
of Serbia by ethnic Albanian insurgents infiltrating from the Kosovo
-Yugoslav buffer zone. The other was the 2001 Macedonian crisis. It
was brought in northwest Macedonia by ethnic Albanian rebels
infiltrating from Kosovo.
These regional crises taking place in two consecutive years
followed NATOs 1999 intervention in the Kosovar conflict. The crises
indicated that Kosovo remained a center generating regional instability.
Ambiguous and frequently escalating demands regarding the provinces
status, combined with proliferation of paramilitary groups, weak
institutions and porous borders explain why has Kosovo been posing
threat to regional security for almost two and a half years now.
Kosovo: Autonomy, Independence or Unification with Kindred
across the Border?
The issue with Kosovos status is not new. It persisted about a
century at the agenda of the Kosovars struggle against the Belgrade
authorities. Depending on circumstances, it took on calls for autonomy,
secession or unification with Albania proper, and/or with ethnic
communities in adjacent states. Calls for autonomy and unification
dominated Kosovos politics well until the early 1990s. Calls for
independence were raised in the early 1990s. We hereafter present
a short survey of facts. The survey points to Kosovo, not Albania
proper (or any other Albanian populated area), as a real threat to
regional stability.
The Kosovar Albanians first formulated their demand for inde-
pendence at the wake of the Yugoslav disintegration. In the early 1990s
Serb authorities abolished Kosovos provincial government and leg-
islature and removed the legal basis for the provinces autonomy.
Kosovars responded by adopting the Kachanik constitution. On 19
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October 1991 Kosovars declared the province a sovereign republic.
Four years later the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) emerged. Its
major aim was liberating Kosovo from Serbian rule (Hedges, 1999:28).
In early 1998 KLA entered an open conflict with the regime in
Belgrade for the establishment of independent Kosovar state.
NATOs 70-day air strike against Yugoslavia was launched with
the aim to improve the human rights situation of the Kosovar
Albanians within Yugoslavia. UNSC Resolution 1244 brought the
strikes to end and confirmed that Kosovo remained a province within
Yugoslavia. NATO campaign improved the situation of the Kosovar
Albanians by removing the Serb authorities from the province and
transforming Kosovo into an international protectorate.
Simultaneously however NATOs intervention helped Kosovars
raise escalating demands. The Kosovar Albanians looked at NATOs
intervention as a step leading to the establishment of Kosovo as
independent republic. Moreover, the Kosovars seemed to have taken
this opportunity to materialize the ambitious strategy of the Coordi-
nation Council of the Albanian Parties in the former Yugoslavia. The
Council was established in the early 1990s with the aim to achieve
consensus and mediate policies of the major Albanian parties in
Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia proper. The Councils
strategy bound the solution of the Kosovar problem to the settlement
of the problems of all ethnic Albanians in the former Yugoslavia.
Achieving independence for Kosovo thereby did not seem to have been
the ultimate goal of the Kosovars. Ethnic unrest soon had to be
expected in neighboring lands.
Kosovars undertook concrete steps in pursuit of this nationalistic
politics. A common military cross-border ethnic Albanian structure was
established to help the struggle of ethnic Albanians in different parts
of the former Yugoslavia. During the Kosovar crisis in 1998-1999,
logistic bases and smuggling routes were established in Albania and
Macedonia for KLA weapons and fighters (Hedges, 1990:40), (North,
1998:50). Rebel training camps were established in Albania near Tirana
and along the Albanian-Yugoslav border. Soon after the onset of the
Kosovar uprising, Northern Albania became a vital staging area for war.
Following the 1999 Kosovar crisis the Kosovo Liberation Army
formally disarmed. Simultaneously, it gave birth to two splinter groups.
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One was the Army for the Liberation of Bujanovac, Presevo and
Medvedja (UCPMB), which operated in south Serbia in 2000-2001
and established control over territories populated by ethnic Albanians.
Ethnic Albanian leaders attempted to merge the problem of south
Serbia with that of Kosovo calling on the international community
to extend Kosovos protectorate to south Serbia (6 March 2001: The
Daily Telegraph).
The other splinter group of the Kosovo Liberation Army was the
Army for National Liberation (NLA) which operated in northwestern
Macedonia in 2001 and also established control over territories
populated by ethnic Albanians.
Reports signify of former KLA staff and commanders being
employed in these KLA branches: (25 Feb 2001: The Observer); (10
March 2001: The Washington Post); (29 March 2001: The Daily
Telegraph); (12 April 2001: The Los Angeles Times); (20 May 2001:
The Sunday Times); (22 May 2001: The Herald); (12 June 2001:
Toronto Star); (2 September 2001: The Observer).
This short survey confirms that Kosovo is, since early 1990s,
the real threat to regional stability. The idea for the establishment of
Greater Albania, which dominated the pan-Albanian politics since late
19th century, was obviously replaced by the idea for the establishment
of a Greater Kosovo.
Kosovo: Criminality and Terrorism
Kosovo threatens regional stability also because criminality and
terrorism are common in Kosovar politics.
Kosovo politics is at times being victimized by criminal elements.
The criminalization of Albanian politics occurred as a network of
Albanian criminal clans, known as fares, became active. These clans
are said to owe their existence to the decay of the Albanian State,
which became obvious in 1997-state crisis (Cilluffo and Salmoiraghi,
1999: 24). Dispersed in Albania, Kosovo, and Macedonia, fares
smuggled arms and men across borders. They helped the founding
of the KLA, as well as the establishment of KLAs bases in neighboring
Albania and Macedonia.
Kosovar terrorism is another problem of regional significance.
Terrorist attacks increased in Kosovo in 2001 in protest at closer links
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between NATO and Belgrade. Peacekeeping units (12 April 2001: The
Washington Post), as well as the office of the Yugoslav government
in Pristina (19 April 2001: The Los Angeles Times) have been targeted
by the Kosovar terrorists.
Countering criminality and terrorism in the province is a challenge
because of the linkage that exists between them. The unit responsible
for countering terrorism is blamed to be maintaining close contacts
with the criminal circles. This unit is the Kosovo Protection Force
(KPF), the Albanian run local police. KPF sprang out of KLA and
maintains links with crime and political violence.
Kosovo: Democratization and Porous Borders
Kosovos democratization is key for achieving stability in the
region. At time when current report is being prepared the extent of
Kosovos democratization is low. Interethnic tension preceded the
building of democratic provincial institutions. Reports indicate that
interethnic incidents increased in the past two years. Examples are
the heightened ethnic tension in Mitrovica in 2000; the ethnic cleansing
of Serbs, Jews, Roma and Muslims; the Kosovars terrorist attacks
on Yugoslav government units and ordinary Slav civilians. Peacekeep-
ing units have been recently targeted by terrorists as well.
Kosovos weak democratic institutions are not a local problem.
Due to Kosovos porous borders Kosovo easily transmits interethnic
hatred in adjacent lands.
In general, Kosovo turned into a major threat for the stability
of the southern Balkans since it came to pursue independence from
Yugoslavia in the early 1990s. Chances for a speedy solution of the
problem are bleak. However, current situation is not out of control.
International and regional community can contribute to reducing ethnic
tension in Kosovo and minimizing risks of ethnic conflicts spilling
over the Kosovo border.
2. Ethnic Factor from Domestic Perspective
The project, Security Challenges and Development of Southern
Balkans, examines the following ethnic groups:
l the Albanians, the Turks, the  Serbs, the Roma and the
Vlachs in Macedonia;
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l the Greeks, the Macedonians, the Montenegrins, the
Roma, the Vlachs, and the Bosnians in Albania;
l the Turks, the Roma, the Armenians, the Karakachani,
the Jews and the Russians in Bulgaria.
With its focus on regional security challenges, the current report
pays special attention to three ethnic groups:
l the Albanians in Macedonia,
l the Greeks in Albania;
l the Turks in Bulgaria.
As outlined these groups are examined in view of group cohesion,
political representation, cultural rights and ethnic unrest.
The Albanians of Macedonia
The Macedonian Albanians are key in assessing security issues
in the southern Balkans. Our project indicated that their large numbers,
concentration along the Kosovar-Macedonian border and strong link-
ages with ethnic brethren in Kosovo make the country vulnerable to
cross-border spillover activism. This activism became clearly notice-
able in 2001 when an ethnic spillover crisis was imported from Kosovo
into the Republic of Macedonia.
Domestic politics and ethnic unrest of the Albanians in Macedonia
frequently took on non-violent or violent protest and demonstration.
Examples are the Bit Pazar incident from 1992 and the Gostivar incident
from 1997. Our project indicated that domestic ethnic politics in
Macedonia does not constitute an immediate threat to regional stability.
Group cohesion
According to 1998 estimate, the ethnic Albanians of Macedonia
are 460,000, out of 2,009,000 country population. They are mostly
concentrated in the western part of the country and they border
Albanian populated areas of Kosovo and south Serbia.
Numbers and border residence ease the intimate relationships and
frequent cross-border activism of the Macedonian Albanians with the
adjacent group of the Kosovars. This activism takes on radical cross-
border communal goals pursued by radical means. This is what
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threatens the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Republic of
Macedonia. Three examples of cross-border activism threatening
Macedonias stability stand out.
In 1968 the Macedonian Albanians set the ideological framework
shaping the profile of intra-Albanian cross-border activism. The
Macedonian Albanians called for the integration in one state of all
ethnic Albanian populated areas of the former Yugoslavia (Vickers,
1995:192). This idea dominated the politics of the Macedonian
Albanians well until 1994. It also frequently lurked underneath the
new politics of extended communal rights pursued by the Macedonian
Albanians after 1994.
Another example of a cross-border activism placing under
question the relatively independent status of the Republic of Macedonia
was the 1981 riot. It broke out in the Pristina University of Kosovo.
Demonstrators demanded full republican status for Kosovo and union
with Albania proper. The Macedonian Albanians took this opportunity
to extend the ethnic protest across the then republican Kosovo-
Macedonian border. They demonstrated in Macedonia, for first time
raising claims for language equality and the establishment of an
Albanian university in Tetovo (Vickers 1995: 205).
Perhaps the most striking example of a cross-border activism
threatening Macedonias stability was the 2001 Macedonian spillover
crisis. The crisis was a combination of radical goals with violent
tactics.
Analysts argued the crisis was not home grown because preceding
interethnic tension was not reported. The minority situation was by
no standards bad.
Conditions for importing the crisis into the country from Kosovo
were ripe. Traditionally strong cross-border links assured pursuit of
common goals and encouraged employment of radical tactics. In the
spring of 2001 the Macedonian Albanians constrained themselves to
pursuing only communal rights within Macedonia. Claims for feder-
alization of the country, or for secession of the Albanian populated
areas were seemingly abandoned seven years ago. However calls for
federalization or secession were never publicly denounced by the ethnic
Albanian leadership. The incursion of rebels from Kosovo in 2001
seemed to have been pursuing a common objective questioning the
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legitimacy of existing state borders. Indeed, the rebels infiltrated
Macedonia in early March following the ratification by the Macedonian
parliament of a long-awaited Yugoslav-Macedonian border treaty (2
March 2001: The Financial Times); (23 April 2001: interview: Georgi
Spasov, SDSM).
The Macedonian Albanians and their brethren across border resort
to violence in pursuit of their goals. Being a part of a governing
coalition ever since Macedonia was established as an independent
state, the Macedonian Albanians had the chance to employ legitimate
means in pursuit of their goals. Nonetheless, the Albanian leadership
in Macedonia maintained intimate relations with Albanian paramilitary
cross-border groups established in the past decade. The All-Albanian
Army (AAA), founded in 1993 was one of them; the National
Liberation Army (NLA) which became active in February 2001 was
another one.
The national belonging of these formations was not clear. They
were established to assist the politics of all ethnic Albanians living in
what was known as former Yugoslavia. The Albanian leadership in
Macedonia never distanced itself from these paramilitary formations.
Moreover, in May 2001 the links between NLA and the ethnic Albanians
of Macedonia nearly brought to collapse the 11-day-old governing
Grand coalition. The coalition, it is to be remembered, brought together
the two major Slav-, and the two major Albanian political parties. The
Albanian parties challenged the coalition by signing a secret peace deal
with the Albanian guerrillas aimed at integrating the guerrillas into the
Macedonian political process. The pact was signed behind the back of
the Slav Macedonian parties and, in discord with the general under-
standing that rebels cannon become a part of the Macedonian political
process (25 May 2001: The Ottawa Citizen).
The rebels failed to get institutionalized. However they keep on
intervening in Macedonian domestic politics. In September 2001, a
month after signing of the framework agreement between the Slav
Macedonian-, and the ethnic Albanian parties for constitutional and
political changes enhancing the status of the ethnic Albanians in the
country, the rebels successfully keep on destabilizing Macedonia by
dictating the circumstances under which the Macedonian security
forces should be allowed to get back into the rebel occupied territories.
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Political representation and cultural rights
Clearly, cross-border activism shakes Macedonias stability. At
that background domestic ethnic politics of the Macedonian Albanians
looks rather moderate.
The Macedonian Albanians are politically represented in their
country. They are a part of the ruling coalition since 1990. Currently
two major ethnic Albanian parties exist. One is the Albanian Party
for Democratic Prosperity (PDP), established in 1990.  The other is
the Albanian Democratic Party (DPA), emerged in 1994 as a splinter
group of PDP. Both parties placed a special significance to furthering
the Albanian cultural rights. PDPs objectives also included the
attainment of proportional representation in government.
However the activities of the ethnic Albanians in Macedonia from
1990 through 1994 were aimed at federalization of Macedonia and
even secession of Albanian populated areas. Albanian domestic politics
took on non-violent and violent protest frequently questioning the
legitimacy of the Macedonian state.
Here are some of the facts. In 1991 the ethnic Albanian PDP
boycotted the promulgation of the new constitution proclaiming
Macedonia an independent nation. PDP protested the constitutions
preamble declaring Macedonia as a national state of the Macedonian
people. On the next year the Macedonian Albanians held a referendum
on the establishment of an independent republic of Illirida. In 1993
PDP boycotted a parliamentary session of the Macedonian parliament
which voted the acceptance of Macedonias temporary name, FYROM,
admitting the country to the United Nations. PDP argued that
Macedonia should not receive international recognition, as long as the
country had a poor minority rights record.
At the time of the 2001 crisis the ethnic Albanian parties raised
claims aimed at democratization of communal rights. More specifically,
the claims included democratization of political and cultural rights such
as: attainment of proportional representation in national army and police;
furthering of power devolution; elevation of the status of the Albanian
language in public life. Yet the Albanian demands indicated that ethnic
Albanians again questioned the legitimacy of the Macedonian state.
They claimed the founding principles of Macedonias Constitution did
not guarantee the rights of ethnic minorities. The ethnic Albanians
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demanded revisions of the Constitutions preamble so that the Basic
document explicitly guarantees the equality of all ethnic groups.
Ethnic unrest
Ethnic unrest occurred occasionally. More violent incidents
occurred before 1994. Their number seemed to have decreased after
that year due to the change in the course of the politics of the ethnic
Albanians. Nonetheless incidents happen indicating that ethnic oppo-
nents are likely to resort to violence in arranging interethnic disputes.
In 1992 ethnic unrest exploded at the Skopje Bit Pazar. Macedonian
police arrested and allegedly severely beat an ethnic Albanian youth
charged with illicit dealing of cigarettes. Ethnic Albanians attacked
the police. Following the disturbances the Interior Ministry announced
the seizure of 2,000 leaflets calling on ethnic Albanians to wage a
war for self-determination.
In 1993 the Macedonian authorities discovered a secret paramili-
tary organization calling itself the All-Albanian Army (AAA). It was
operating within the army of the Republic of Macedonia (RFL/RL
Vol 3, #4, 28 Jan 1994). Some analysts point to this ethnic Albanian
organization as planning to stage an armed rebellion in Macedonia
with the intent to create the Republic of Illirida (Fackler 1997: 74).
Others maintain that the incident aimed at espionage rather than
separatist or irredentist goals (RFE/RL Vol 3, # 4, 28 Jan 1994).
In 1994 tensions in the city of Tetovo concerning the forthcoming
July population census erupted into interethnic violence between the
ethnic Albanians and the Macedonians.
Unrest did not wane even after ethnic Albanians changed their
politics in 1994. In 1997 symbols came to play important role in
shaping interethnic relations in the republic. In that year the govern-
ment sent special force to the town of Gostivar to help arrange an
ethnic dispute on the nature of communal symbols hanging outside
the town hall. The incident ended leaving several policemen wounded,
two ethnic Albanians dead, one beaten by policed and three hundred
and twelve arrested.
The above survey of cross-border and domestic political activism
proves that Macedonia is key in assessing regional stability. The survey
shows that Macedonia is very much threatened by frequent destabi-
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lization of cross-border ethnic turmoil. On the other hand, Macedonias
domestic ethnic politics does not threaten regional stability. Ethnic
incidents, such as Bit Pazar (1992) and Gostivar (1997), showed that
domestic ethnic crises are likely but they are by no means imminent.
The Greeks of Albania
The Greeks in Albania do not currently seem to pose a threat
either to regional security, or to domestic stability. The ethnic Greeks
raised nationalistic demands and resorted to violence only in the first
years of Albanias democratic transition. Since Socialist Party returned
to power in 1997 the ethnic Greeks participate peacefully and by legal
means in Albanias domestic politics, while the Greek-Albanian
interstate relations are steadily improving.
This situation is not irreversible however. A possible civil turmoil
may shake again the country dragging in the ethnic Greeks and spilling
over into neighboring Kosovo. Preventive solutions should be sought
in furthering the democratization of Albanian domestic politics.
Group cohesion
According to 1998 estimate, the Greeks of Albania are 117,000,
out of 3,331,000-country population. They are concentrated in the
Southern Albanian cities of Gjirokaster and Sarande.
The ethnic Greeks territorial proximity to their mother country
presented a challenge to regional stability and Albanias territorial
integrity, at the time of Berishas Democratic Party rule (March 1992
- March 1997). The peak of interethnic tension lasted from June1993
through March 1995. The interethnic relations in Albania, as well as
the Greek-Albanian interstate relations, worsened as a result of
nationalist activities pursued by the ethnic Greeks aimed at secession
of southern Albania (or Northern Epirus) to Greece. Ethnic Greek
religious and political leaders, as well as ordinary ethnic Greeks, took
an active part in the nationalist campaigns. Here are some of the most
striking facts:
In June 1993 Greek Archimandrite Chrystosomos Maidhonis
was deported from Albania for having distributed pro-Hellenic
literature claiming the cession of southern Albania to Greece.  Ethnic
Greeks near the city of Gjirokaster clashed with Albanian police in
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protest of deportation.
In February 1994 Metropolitan Archbishop Serapheim ended his
sermon appealing to his congregation to unite Northern Epirus with
Greece.
In April 1994 a group calling itself Northern Epirus Liberation
Front (MAVI) attacked an Albanian border unit shouting separatist
slogans.
In November 1994 Albanian Greeks unanimously rejected in a
referendum a draft constitution for Albania, claiming the basic
document of the country had failed to protect the ethnic and religious
minority rights.
The heightened interethnic tension in Albania worsened the
Albanian-Greek interstate relationships. Albania came to deport po-
litically dangerous figures to Greece. Albania also detained and trailed
members of Omonia, the ethnic Greeks political and cultural orga-
nization, who were suspected of involvement in separatist actions.
Greece reciprocated by deporting nearly 200,000 illegal Albanian
immigrants and announcing its intent to create a special unit to its
northern border to stop thousands of illegal immigrants from entering
the country. The two countries reciprocally expulsed their diplomats.
Interethnic tension in Albania seemingly calmed down in the
spring and summer of 1995.  Greece and the ethnic Greeks contributed
to the decrease of ethnic and interstate tension. Greece recalled a
diplomat from Albania having found in his possession pamphlets
inciting separatism. Greece also arrested members of MAVI, the most
radical nationalist organization of the ethnic Greeks, charging them
of murder of two Albanian soldiers.
Since fall of 1995 ethnic Greeks in Albania seem to have changed
their politics. Claims for cession from Albania were replaced by claims
for widening of communal rights.
Political representation and cultural rights
Notwithstanding nationalist claims, the ethnic Greeks never
seriously threatened Albania by secession. The ethnic Greeks did not
threaten Albania by domestic instability either. In 1997 and 1998 the
group became a victim of Albanias civil turbulence. Yet the ethnic
Greeks managed to assure full access to electoral process. They also
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widened their cultural and human rights within Albania. Here are some
of the facts proving this observation:
Ethnic Greeks are politically represented in Albania since 1991.
Their first ethnic party was Omonia. Omonia took part in the first
and the second multiparty elections held in 1991. The party captured
five seats in a 250-seat parliament. Omonias political goals were not
clearly specified.
Omonia was effectively prohibited from participation in the 1992
elections.  Following that elections Albanian authorities came to
suspect Omonia of committing espionage, fomenting separatism and
possessing weapons. Arrests, detentions, interrogations and trials of
Omonias members followed.
Since 1992 the ethnic Greeks participated in Albanias political
process running on the ticket of the Human Rights Union Party
(HRUP). HRUP was established in 1992 as a result of negotiations
between Greece and Albania. Its aim was to represent the interests
of national minorities, and more concretely those of the ethnic Greeks.
The partys members amounted to nearly 40,000 people. The party
was active in the south of the country. Vasil Melo became the partys
president.
The party experienced a serious organizational and ideological
trouble during the 1996-1997 state crisis. Aiming to retain access to
Albanian political process under any circumstances, the Human Rights
Party faced itself with the need to side in a quarrel between the ruling
Democratic Party of Sali Berisha and the opposition Socialist Party.
The Democratic Party had claimed that it had won the 1996
parliamentary elections by an overwhelming majority. Socialists and
other opposition parties maintained the elections were fraudulent.
Socialists withdrew from the electoral process.
After short deliberations Vasil Melo, the Human Rights party
chief, announced that his party would participate in the second round
of parliamentary elections. The party crisis occurred as Thoma Mico,
the number two in the party, severely criticized Melo for formally
supporting the Democrats. The crisis worsened as the Democrat-
Socialist quarrel took on an all-out civil war that nearly brought the
country to a state collapse.
The internal partys quarrel eventually ended with the 1997
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Human Rights Partys  participation in Berishas government. The
government however was short live as rebels managed to establish
control in the south and demanded that President Berisha resign.
General elections in late June replaced President Berishas Democratic
Party from power. The Human Rights Party then became a member
of the majority coalition Alliance for the State, led by Socialist
Prime-Minister Fatos Nano. Nanos later replacement by Pandeli
Majko (1998) and Ilir Meta (1999) did not impact on the ethnic
Greeks access to political process and representation.
Human and cultural rights widened for the ethnic Greeks. Issues
of human rights violations came to dominate the ethnic Greeks politics
since 1994 when persecution of Omonia members became frequent.
Accusations of human rights violations were first raised on behalf of
Greece. At a later point in time, accusations of human rights violations
committed by Albanian authorities were also echoed by the Initiative
Committee for Northern Epirus, a coalition of more than 30 ethnic
Greek political, cultural and workers associations.
The principal problems with granting of cultural rights have been
arranged as late as 1996. Until 1995 three newspapers were coming
out in Greek language. A radio station broadcast Greek-language
programs. Greek language classes were taught in primary and high
schools, while an Albanian-Greek treaty of cooperation provided for
the full arrangement of the Greek language education in Albania.
Priests from Greece augmented the indigenous clergy of the Albanian
Orthodox Church to serve Greek speaking congregations. In 1997
the ethnic Greeks preceded with claims for wider participation in
local government. As State Department observed in 1996, the
Albanian Greeks had become an integral part of the Albanian
society.
Ethnic unrest
Ethnic unrest has been twice reported in the country. One was
the 1993 clash near Gjirokaster between the Albanian police and 300
ethnic Greeks who protested the deportation of Archimandrite
Chrystostomos from Albania for being involved in separatist activities.
The other was the 1994 attack by gunmen of the North Epirus
Liberation Front (MAVI) on an Albanian border unit.
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Some (Italian) sources argued that ethnic Greeks were behind
the 1997 Albanias rebellion (14 March 1997: BBC). Others
warned of a danger of a Greek-inspired breakaway republic in
south Albania ceding at the time of the rebellion (22 March 1997:
The Times).
Such claims drew on the close links existing between the ethnic
Greeks and the Albanian Socialists. These links might have helped
the Socialists sympathizers establish control over the southern part
of the country, populated by ethnic Greeks.
Reasonable as they may look, none of the above claims have ever
been proven.
What seems obvious though is that Greece maintains intimate
relations with Albanian Socialist politicians. Greeces active diplo-
macy during the 1997 and 1998 political crises seems to have
helped settle political crises in the country. Greeces linkages with
the Socialists, however, as well as the presence of Greek troops
in Albania, as part of the European multinational force sent to
Albania in 1997 in a bit to prevent state collapse, could turn out
to be a short live guarantee for political stability and ethnic peace
in the country. A withdrawal of Greek troops from Albania, or a
shift in electoral preferences of the population, may cause a political
chaos, which could easily drag in the ethnic Greeks and destabilize
the region by hitting Kosovo.
Currently, Albania enjoys ethnic and civic peace. However, it is
not irreversible. If instigated, political/ethnic conflicts may threaten
political/ethnic stability of Albania and nearby lands.
The Turks of Bulgaria
The Turks of Bulgaria do not seem to pose threat either to
regional security, or to domestic stability. The ethnic Turks used
to be politically active in the first years of Bulgarias democratic
transition. Since 1995 however the ethnic Turks enjoy a large
spectrum of communal rights. Their participation in Bulgarias
democratic politics does not differ much from that of the ethnic
Bulgarians. Their major concern seems to be the same: the
improvement of their economic status and the democratization of
their political party.
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Group cohesion
According to 1998 estimate, the Turks of Bulgaria are 700,000
out of 8,240,000 country population. They live in two pockets in
northeastern and southeastern Bulgaria. They are remnants of the
Ottomans who dominated large portions of the Balkan Peninsula until
late 19th century.
Territorial proximity of some ethnic Turks to Turkey does not
threaten regional stability. The explanation rests with the goals pursued
by the Bulgarian Turks. Unlike the Kosovar and Macedonian Alba-
nians, unlike even the Albanian Greeks, who raised claims for
boundary adjustment along ethnic lines, the Bulgarian Turks never
formulated their goals in territorial terms. The Bulgarian Turks
demanded participation in the national and local structures of power
and extension of cultural rights.
The only time when ethnic situation in Bulgaria really challenged
regional stability was 1989 when tens of thousands of ethnic Turks
forcibly left Bulgaria for Turkey. The mass exodus of the ethnic Turks
was the final episode of an unsuccessful assimilation campaign of ethnic
Turks launched in 1984 by the communist regime. The campaign aimed
at replacing the Islamic names of the ethnic Turks, by Slavic ones. The
exodus signalized of a mass violation of human rights. The Bulgarian-
Turkish interstate relationships significantly worsened leading some
analysts to predict Bulgarian-Turkish interstate war.
Ethnic Turks reportedly returned to Bulgaria in 1989 and 1990
following the collapse of the communist regime in Bulgaria.
Political representation and cultural rights
Domestic ethnic politics of Bulgarian Turks are moderate. The
politics combine legitimate democratic goals and peaceful means
for their achievement.
The ethnic Turks are politically represented in their country.
Their party, the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF), was
founded in January 1990. The party is considered to be a political
organization on ethnic base. While it represents the interests of the
ethnic Turks, the party also attracts votes of some ethnic Bulgarians.
The party leader, Ahmed Dogan, played an important role in
identifying communal rights that mattered for the Turkish community.
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They included cultural and political rights, such as free selection of
personal names and free practice of minority religion; education in
mother tongue; participation in national and local authorities. The
above rights have been achieved and institutionalized from 1990
through 1996. Cultural rights and political representation at national
level dominated Turkish ethnic politics from 1990 through 1995.
Political participation on local level dominated Turkish ethnic politics
in 1995. We hereafter present some of the facts:
Issues of cultural rights and political participation at national
level dominated the politics of the ethnic Turks in 1990. The Turks
consolidated as a politically significant group in that year as
Bulgarian nationalists organized strikes and mass protests against
granting of political and cultural rights to minorities.
Bulgarian nationalists, ethnic Turks and Muslims, the govern-
ment and opposition, eventually reached an agreement aimed at
diffusing the ethnic tension in the country. The agreement asserted
the cultural rights of the ethnic Turks, in particular the right to free
selection of name and free practicing of minority religion. The
agreement simultaneously confirmed the integrity of the state that
the Bulgarian nationalists thought was under threat by the extension
of communal rights.
In 1991 issues of language education were at the political
agenda. The Bulgarian Socialist Party (former Communists) attempted
to ban MRF and prohibit Turkish language classes in state schools.
The Supreme Court eventually ruled out banning of the MRF. Turkish
language classes were allowed in state schools after the democratic
opposition, the Union of Democratic Forces (UDF), won parliamen-
tary elections.
In 1995 another ethnic problem awaited its resolution. The
problem was the access of the Turkish minority to the structures of
local authority. The problem emerged in the city of Kardzhali, where
MRF won the municipal and mayoral elections. BSP (the Socialist
Party) contested the Kardzhalis mayoral election in court and
delayed the opening of the session of the newly elected municipal
council. The court annulled the election. In 1996 however the
Supreme Court confirmed the election of the ethnic Turk as mayor
of Kardzhali.
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Ethnic unrest
Ethnic unrest was not reported in Bulgaria. A couple of
peaceful demonstrations occurred in the country. They were organized
by the ethnic Turks, as well as by nationalist opponents.
In 1989 the ethnic Turks demonstrated against cultural oppres-
sion and demanded the restoration of their religious rights. In 1991
Turkish schoolchildren demonstrated demanding rights on education
in Turkish language.
In 1990 the Bulgarian nationalists protested against granting
of cultural and political rights to the ethnic Turks.
On the whole, the ethnic situation in Bulgaria is calm. To see
the real problem in the country one has to look at Bulgarias recent
economic and political development.
III. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
The above report could be shortly summarized as follows: Kosovo poses
a military threat to the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Republic
of Macedonia. Interethnic relations in Macedonia pose political and
military threat to Macedonias domestic stability. Interethnic relations
in Albania are threatened by civic unrest resulting from the poor
democratization of the country. Ethnic peace seems to be stable in the
Republic of Bulgaria. However the country and its Turkish minority are
threatened by economic insecurity and vulnerable political institutions.
Could the international community, politicians and civil society
contribute to a lasting ethnic peace in the region? The Institute for
Regional and International Studies in Sofia suggests the following
policy recommendations:
1) The politics of the international community in Kosovo seems
to be the biggest challenge. The international community should seek
to succeed in accomplishing a threefold strategy.
a) The international community should first try to stop smuggling
of arms and professional fighters through the Kosovo border with Serbia
and Macedonia. The ideal solution would be for the international
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community to seal off the Kosovo borders. Reports inform of attempts
made in this direction. NATO peacekeepers reportedly set patrols along
Kosovos border in March 2001 in a bid to block ethnic Albanian
guerrillas from crossing into Macedonia (19 March 2001: The Guardian).
International observers noted however that borders in that part
of the region are difficult to control. To assure higher efficiency, the
international community encouraged cooperation with border authori-
ties of neighboring countries. In late May 2001 for instance, Yugoslav
troops moved back to the Kosovar-Yugoslav border zone to prevent
incursions of ethnic Albanian guerrillas from Kosovo into south Serbia.
b) The international community should also try to counter
terrorism in Kosovo and assist the process of democratization of the
province. Some measures in this direction have already been
undertaken. An example was the dismissal by the UN authorities
of 2,000 members of the ethnic Albanian police, the Kosovo
Protection Force (KPF), suspected of intention to join the
Macedonian National Liberation Army (1 April 2001: The Sunday
Times). Another example was, the preparation by the UN authorities
of tough anti-terrorist laws which would let UN authorities list and
fight banned groups, and penalize companies and individuals dealing
with them (19 May 2001: The Financial Times).
c) Finally, the selection of a status for the Kosovo province should
not be a matter to urge with. In the course of the past two years the
international community showed commitment to preserving Kosovo as
a constituent autonomous part of Yugoslavia. Here are some initiatives
of the international community aimed at that. The Contact Group made
a decision to hold elections on 17 November 2001 for Kosovar
provisional government. Elections have to hand power from the UN
to the Kosovar Albanians but also forestall calls for independence from
Serbia. Secretary of State Colin Powell backed the plan (14 April, 2001:
The Financial Times). More recently Hans Haekkerup, UN special
representative to Kosovo promised that UN will retain presence in the
province after elections and ensure compliance with UNSC Resolution
1244 (15 May 2001: The Independent).
Another initiative aimed at averting Kosovos secession from
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Yugoslavia was a visit to Kosovo paid in the spring of 2001 by the
then British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook. The visit followed
election of Milo Djukanovic as president of Montenegro. Still prior
to his election Djukanovic was giving signs that he would favor
Montenegros secession from Yugoslavia. Cook worried lest a new
wave of secession, beginning with Montenegro and ending with
Kosovo, was underway. Cooks visit to Kosovo aimed at dissuading
the provinces leadership from undertaking secessionist attempts.
Cook recommended the improvement of Kosovo-Serbia relations and
abandoning ideas for Kosovo independence (25 April 2001: The
Independent).
If the Kosovars are yet to obtain independence from Yugoslavia
they will have to prove that they are used to the norms of democratic
life. The presence of the international community in the province
was a step aimed at helping the accommodation of the Kosovar
Albanians to political and ethnic democracy. However the real test
of democratization would be the work of the ethnic Albanian
administration with the Belgrades new authorities.
Since their election in late 2000 the Belgrade authorities made
a considerable progress in democratizing of their country. Here are
some facts. The Yugoslav authorities promised democratic reforms
to improve the status of the ethnic Albanians in south Serbia that
let the Yugoslav forces back into the Kosovo-Yugoslav buffer zone.
The Yugoslav court martial came to try own soldiers. The Yugoslav
army released Albanian political prisoners. Amnesty was offered to
the insurgents in south Serbia. Milosevic was turned over to the UN
war crime tribunal to stand trial for crimes against humanity. War
crimes in Kosovo performed by Milosevics regime have been
publicly uncovered.
The Belgrades improving democracy record indicates that the
Kosovar Albanians are no longer in a situation of ethnic oppression
that would have justified immediate cession from Yugoslavia. The
international community should have to encourage the Kosovar
Albanians to walk down their part of the road leading to the
establishment of a multiethnic democracy in Yugoslavia. The opposite,
i.e. Kosovos independence at that moment, would only escalate the
ethnic Albanian demands and result into calls for secession of
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neighboring Albanian populated border areas.
2) Next challenge is the interethnic politics in the Republic of
Macedonia. The strategy to be pursued is threefold.
a) The Macedonian authorities should try to speedily overcome
the Slav Macedonian nationalism. The initially good politics of
cooperation, pursued by VMRO and DPA from February 1999 through
February 2001, prevented Macedonias destabilization at the time of
the Kosovo crisis. This interethnic cooperation established at the highest
state level created the impression that Macedonia would remain the only
republic of ex-Yugoslavia capable of successfully handling its interethnic
relations. Macedonia owes this politics of cooperation to three statesmen:
Boris Trajkovski, Ljubco Georgievski and Arben Xhaferi.
The establishment of the Grand coalition in May 2001 and
the integration of the Socialist party in it radicalized the Slav
Macedonian politicians. The new configuration of power prevented
the speedy completion of interethnic negotiations. Here is one
example. In June 2001 Prime Minister Ljubco Georgievski offered
changes in the Constitution, that would make Albanian language
official, and declare the ethnic Albanians a second constitutive
nation. Socialist leader Branco Crvenkovski rejected the suggestions
and threatened to collapse the coalition government.
The radicalization of Slav Macedonian politicians caused
radicalization of the Slav Macedonian citizens. Civilians stormed
the parliament in June, July and September 2001 protesting the
process of democratization of communal rights. More importantly,
the Macedonian Interior Ministry armed civilians to fight ethnic
Albanians in the country.
The improvement of the ethnic situation in the country is in the
hands of all ethnic communities. Most of the political means helping
attain such an end are, however, in the hands of the Slav Macedonian
authorities. These authorities should start by turning their backs to
nationalist sentiments and looking more pragmatically at identity
issues. The International Fact-finding Mission to the Republic of
Macedonia, organized by the Institute for Regional and International
Studies in late April 2001, has recommended a change of Constitutions
preamble defining Macedonia not as a nation state composed of ethnic
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communities but rather as a civic state integrating its citizens.
b) The Macedonian authorities should also be more sensitive
to grievances of their ethnic minorities and more responsive to
their ethnic minorities demands. Calls for democratization of
ethnic Albanian rights have been raised since 1994. From 1994
though 2001 nothing has been done to meet these legitimate
demands. Nothing signified the elevation of the status of the
Albanian language in Macedonias public life, or the improvement
of conditions of education in Albanian language. No steps have
been undertaken to assure proportional representation of ethnic
Albanians in army and police. What is more, in September 2001,
a month after the framework agreement for the improvement of
interethnic relations in Macedonia was signed, Macedonian MPs
threaten to put the peace deal to referendum and thereby annul
the work of peace negotiations. The Macedonian authorities should
change their old-style approach to ethnic issues and realize that
the granting of communal rights like those above are common
throughout democratizing East Europe.
c) Not least, the Macedonian authorities should try to improve
their relationships with the West. The current relations of Macedonia
with her Western partners are relatively good. Macedonia has
acknowledged the role of the international community in hamper-
ing foreign incursions aimed at disintegration of the country.
However some activities on behalf of the Slav Macedonians
and their politicians indicate that the process of westernization of
Macedonia has not yet been completed. The July 2001 example
stands out. In early July the international envoys, James Pardew
and Fracois Leotard, handed to the Macedonian leaders the
framework agreement of a reconciliation plan. The discussions
were soon interrupted as the Macedonian leaders verbally attacked
the Western mediators and rejected the peace package of reforms.
The Slav Macedonian leadership argued the suggested reforms
were a blatant violation of Macedonias internal affairs. The
Slav Macedonians echoed the actions of their politicians. They
staged protests at foreign embassies and offices, and physically
destructed part of the foreign offices property.
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The anti-Western campaign of the Slav Macedonians in July
2001 did not correspond with the initially good relationships
between Macedonia and the West. In her interaction with the
international community Macedonia should have more trust in
international initiatives, which since the crisis beginning, support
the countrys territorial integrity, its sovereignty, as well as its
the ruling elite.
3) The current ethnic situation in Albania is calm. However,
civic peace is not yet stable in this country. A civic unrest, if
it occurs, may worsen interethnic relations and threaten regional
stability. Our policy recommendation concerns mostly civic and
political relationships. Ethnic relations and regional stability are
considered within the general civic-political framework.
The current peace in Albania is due to the politics of the
ruling Socialist Party. A contribution to the countrys stability has
also Greeces politics, which has been very active since 1997
Albanian state crisis. Greece interacted with her Albanian coun-
terparts exchanging state delegations and initiating meetings
between leading Albanian and Greek politicians.
Yet there is a problem in this seeming political calm in
Albania. And it is the low degree of integration of opposition
Democrats in Albanias domestic politics. Following Berishas
resign in 1997, the Democrats showed that they were yet capable
of threatening domestic stability. In 1998 the country survived a
new political crisis caused by the Democrats demand of Prime
Minister Fatos Nanos resignation.
This paper recommends a speedy integration of the Democrats
in Albanias political process. Democrats integration is important
because the party controls a serious human potential for political
mobilization. The Socialists are known to be stronger in the South.
The Democrats are stronger in the North. Should a civic unrest
occur, it would confront the North and the South.
Moreover, civic unrest might have worse consequences when
looking at it through ethnic lenses and considering its impact on
the regional stability. A civic unrest may take on ethnic conflict and
threaten regional stability by involving Kosovo in it. Specifically,
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a North-South civic confrontation could drag in the ethnic Greeks
who live in the South. Most likely, the ethnic Greeks would side
with the Socialists who are in control of the South. A North-South
confrontation could further spillover into Kosovo. Kosovo borders
on northern Albania and maintains close connections with it.
4) Bulgarias current ethnic situation is calm. The ethnic
Turks are integrated in Bulgarias politics at national and local
level. Civic peace also seems to be stable. Civic confrontations
on ideological base are occasional. Bulgarias security problem
is neither ethnic, nor civic. Bulgarias problem is economic
insecurity and vulnerable political institutions. Our policy recom-
mendations mostly concern Bulgarias economy and politics.
Ethnic issues and regional stability are considered within an
economic-political framework.
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CHAPTER III
THE IMPACT OF ARMED CONFLICTS
IN FORMER YUGOSLAVIA ON THE
ESTABLISHMENT AND FUNCTIONING
OF THE ORGANIZED CRIME
ON THE BALKANS
Yovo Nikolov
The armed conflicts on the territory of former Yugoslavia in the last
10 years made a significant contribution to the establishment and
strengthening of the organized crime on the Balkans. No country in
Southeastern Europe remained immune to this process. The proximity
of armed conflicts to countries like Bulgaria, Albania and Macedonia
created a sustainable core of criminal groups used to interacting with
one another in recent years. International organized crime still poses
real threats to the political and economic development of Southeastern
Europe. Crises in the region speeded up the establishment and
strengthening of organizations with significant criminal potential that
found their bases and channels and penetrated deeply in political
parties and state administration.
Organized criminal groups are involved in five major types of
activities:
q smuggling petrol, cigarettes and arms;
q stealing and traffic of motor vehicles;
q traffic in illegal emigrants and trade in women;
q traffic and production of drugs;
q blackmail (racketeering) and robberies.
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From institutional perspective, the countries in Southeastern
Europe are at different level of their development. Therefore the
organized crime analysis in each of the countries has to be based
on different informational criteria. Whereas Bulgaria has particu-
larly sustainable statehood, Kosovo lacks any institutions that
should regulate crime. In Macedonia, prior to the conflict eruption
near Tetovo, there were quite distinctive state structures dealing
with crime, but after the conflict, the greater part of them is
engaged in analyzing terrorist groups. Following the riots in 1997
the statehood in Albania still strives to recover its positions. While
in Bulgaria there are distinct and transparent statistics and the
media are quite free, unfortunately, data on trends in crime in
Albania and Macedonia are insignificant and inaccurate, and in
Kosovo they are completely missing.
In analytical perspective, however, this provides opportunity
to examine how the armed conflicts affect more stable countries
like Bulgaria. Therefore, a more detailed review of the crime
development in the last 10 and especially in the previous 5 years
is needed because the shifts in interests, trends and development
of the organized criminal groups are more distinguishable. Also,
for explicit reasons, the major channels for traffic in people, goods
and drugs for Macedonia, Kosovo and Albania pass through
Bulgaria. Thus, examining changes in illegal traffic could draw
some conclusions for the development of personal security and
criminality in Southeastern Europe.
ESTABLISHING AND STRENGTHENING
ORGANIZED CRIME
In Bulgaria, the organized crime activities have been generally
related to the bully groups that emerged in 1993-1994. These
groups are made up of former sportsmen in wrestling, boxing and
weightlifting. They were basically involved in armed robberies on
roads, stealing and traffic of vehicles, gambling, prostitution
procuring, racketeering under the form of providing security
services to small- and medium-size enterprises, smuggling of
cigarettes and liquor. After introducing a license regime for
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security guarding firms in the end of 1994, the bully groups
re-registered as insurance companies versed in motor vehicles
insurance and thus they continued to blackmail the automobile
owners in the country.
It should be pointed out that bully groups are the tip of
the iceberg of Bulgarian organized crime. Officers of former secret
services, a part of the communist party staff, and newly emerged
politicians joined these structures.
During the first embargo on Yugoslavia, these structures,
assisted by former officers of the secret services and civil servants,
successfully participated in smuggling of fuel (petrol) to former
Yugoslavia. Thus, they accumulated sufficient funds to take part
later on in the privatization of state- and municipally owned
enterprises of tourist and food-processing industries. Hence, a
significant part of these industries and clusters of their sectors
fell under the control of these mafia-like groups.
After the UDF government came into power in 1997 the whole
capacity of the state institutions has been used to combat the
bully groups. Amendments to the Insurance Bill were adopted
to set high requirements for the founding capital of the insurance
companies (between 3 and 6 million DEM with certified origin
for different types of insurance). Thus, the bully groups were
officially driven away from the insurance business. However, there
are reasonable grounds to consider that bully groups still control
this market using token offshore companies.
Due to the restrictions of the registration regime of expensive
vehicles introduced by the Bulgarian traffic police authorities and
the licensing of tradesmen in spare parts, the robberies of cars
substantially decreased, and this directly stroke organized criminal
groups. Some of these groups got divided from their patrons
and went back to working on their own in the streets. It resulted
in occasional peaks of certain brands of stolen vehicles.
Regardless of the apparent control over mafia-like structures,
they still control gambling, prostitution and are considerably
involved in sports. Also, these groups have quite legal business
and in some sectors they even pay taxes.
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SMUGGLING  THE BASE OF ORGANIZED
CRIME ON THE BALKANS
Smuggling is among the major means for illegal acquisition of funds
by mafia structures. It is directly related to transborder crime activities,
as well as to the establishment of Bulgarian and Balkan mafia groups.
The cooperation between regional criminal groups most frequently
takes the form of operating smuggling channels. On the other hand,
smuggling and operating transborder channels are a major threat to
the promotion of market economy, which badly affects the confidence
and presence of foreign investments on the Balkans. Smuggling could
even destroy the production and development of a given sector on
a regional scale and undermine the establishment and fostering of state
institutions.
In 1991-1993 there was a juridical and institutional chaos. It was
exactly what enabled former secret service officers and communist
party cadres to use their contacts and keep state-run smuggling
channels. Then there was a tremendous inflow in Bulgaria of cigarettes,
liquor, sugar, fuel, alcohol, etc with no revenue to the state budget.
Nearly the same is happening now in Serbia, Macedonia, Albania and
Kosovo. Previous contacts of former Bulgarian secret services with
some terrorist organizations in the Middle East, Turkey and Africa
were transformed into private smuggling channels operating for the
benefit of one or another group, serving to one or another party.
Running of contraband traffic is due to the assistance of criminal
and shadow groups. The corruption activities of such cooperation often
go beyond its definition (authority-bribe-resolution-covering). Some-
times it gets the typical elements for the organized crime  intimi-
dation, blackmailing, and murder. Though having different character-
istics, not compulsory, the major reason for these criminal activities
stems from the illegal financial relations between criminal structures
and civil servants.
Running the criminal traffic of stolen vehicles through the borders
during 1992  1994, Bulgarian groups of former sportsmen and ex-
policemen began establishing parallel contraband channels often
doubling the existing ones, or with the participation of one and the
same customs and border administration officers. In practice, these
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bully structures gained control on the existing smuggling channels.
The stockpiled critical mass of dirty money by bully groups has
been utilized and multiplied by breaching the embargo on Yugoslavia
that turned to catalyze the structuring and fostering of Bulgarian
organized crime.
Similar is the current situation particularly in Serbia where the
contraband import has been run by Serbian secret services. After the
fall of Milosevic, the same contraband routes gradually began to be
overridden by shadowy and distinctly criminal businessmen. In 1999-
2000 in Serbia several ordered murders of criminal underworld bosses
and senior officers of Serbian secret services have been committed.
One of the versions explains that it is the way to facilitate the
privatization of transborder channels that have been previously
supervised by Milosevics secret services.
In Albania after the riots of the depositors in financial pyramids
in 1997 the border areas have been practically managed by various
clans and families that are considerably mighty, especially in the
southwestern part of the country. The northern and eastern parts of
the country in fact have no border with Kosovo and Macedonia, thus
being completely criminal. This has been particularly witnessed during
the Kosovo crisis and NATO forces withdrawal afterwards. The routes
have been immediately overridden by Albanian and Kosovar mafia
clans or by Macedonian Albanian groups in Western Macedonia.
CONTRABAND DURING THE FIRST
EMBARGO ON YUGOSLAVIA
In 1993  1995 the breaching of the international embargo on
Yugoslavia has been an unofficial state policy of Bulgaria. Breaking
the ban on imports of fuel has been conducted again under the control
and within the frames of the former Bulgarian secret services. For the
implementation of the criminal deals, however, it was necessary to
corrupt a number of civil servants and officials who would provide
the necessary railway tankers, transport corridors, fuel loading and
unloading terminals, customs officers and ministerial clerks. Such an
organization could not be guaranteed without the participation of senior
policy-makers and officials from the Ministry of Interior. According to
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some government data, at that time more than 400 big deals in different
goods for Yugoslavia were revealed that defrauded the countrys revenue
by more than USD 250 million. There were as well as dozens of fuel
contraband cases causing damages for millions of USD.
Statistics show that despite the embargo, Bulgarian exports to the
former Yugoslav states in 1994 rose by 43 % compared to the previous
year. In terms of USD this is 571 million compared to USD 387 million
in 1993 (concerning registered deals that are basically about 40 %
of total transactions). One of the basic schemes for breaking the
embargo was exporting to Macedonia wherefrom the goods freely
entered in Yugoslavia due to the lack of a border. The free passing
of goods through the territory of Bulgaria has been provided by current
and former officers of the secret services even in cooperation with
respective Macedonian and Serbian secret services. The same schemes
have also facilitated the export of nitrate fertilizers. Arms from Russia,
Ukraine and other former Soviet republics used to pass through
Bulgaria on their way to Bosnia. During the wars in Yugoslavia, all
the supplies for the state were illegal and criminal, controlled by the
secret services, the military and Milosevics staff. There were even
cases of underworld groups and paramilitary establishments trading
arms and fuel with both warring parties  with Serbs and Bosnians,
with Serbs and Kosovar Albanians. Neboisa Covic, Serb Vice Prime-
Minister and Director of the Coordination Center for Kosovo and
Metohia, made the following statement regarding the situation in Veliki
Tarnovac  one of the key places for contraband in former Yugoslavia
in the region of Presevo Valley:
 It seems that the only thing in common there were Serb-
Albanian criminal gangs and mafia. Examining the structure of
weaponry it is evident that 80 % of that weaponry is our product.
It had not come from the heavens. It is a pity, but that is the truth.
HAS THE EMBARGO BEEN BREACHED
DURING THE KOSOVO CONFLICT?
The expectations that Bulgaria would disregard completely the petrol
embargo on Yugoslavia did not come true. There are several reasons
for this:
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First, Bulgaria unlike in the period 1993-1995, committed to keep
strictly the sanctions imposed by NATO. The breach of the previous
embargo was caused by the involvement or the silent consent of the
state and its officials. During the conflict, the administrative apparatus
along the western border has been completely replaced. Another reason
is the newly adopted law on the Ministry of Interior. According to
the new regulations the officers of the National Security Service (heir
to the previous Second Directorate of the Bulgarian Secret Services)
were dismissed from the border checkpoints. Their functions have been
assumed in 1997 by the restructuring Border Police. Thus in practice
some of the existing contraband channels have been severed. Con-
siderable police forces have been deployed to guard the western border
against contraband from eastern Bulgaria.
The second reason concerns the specifics of the Kosovo conflict.
NATO strikes took two months, the war came to close proximity to
Bulgaria and all transport vehicles were potential targets of NATO
aircraft. Yugoslavia did not lack fuel and other commodities as much
and their prices were not as high as it was expected. Macedonia,
through which the greater part of the contraband traffic to former
Yugoslavia had been passing previously, was then flooded with
NATO troops because of the threats of conflict spillover. These troops
de facto controlled the border with Kosovo where the convoys of
embargoed goods previously passed. Then the channels through
Montenegro and Romania to Serbia were put into operation.
The third reason to observe the embargo is the practical closure
of border between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. During the NATO strikes
a minimum amount of transport vehicles have passed through the
Bulgarian-Serbian border.
TRAFFIC OF DRUGS AND WOMEN
The following example shows the significance of breaching the
international embargo on Yugoslavia. According to research conducted
until the end of 1997 by the Institute for Criminology Studies affiliated
to the Chief Prosecutors Office, when the first embargo on Yugoslavia
was lifted, conventional criminality in the Vidin region (adjacent to
the Bulgarian-Serb border) has risen by 55 % (the countrys average
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is 23.4%). The grave crimes against personality in 1997 rose by 67%
(countrys average growth is 29 %). In Blagoevgrad and Kyustendil
(other border adjacent regions) the growth of conventional crimes is
36 % and 35.7 %, respectively. The major reasons for these anomalies
are poverty and unemployment in the regions adjacent to the
Bulgarian-Yugoslav border, which is two times higher, compared to
the other regions of the country. That is, during the first embargo
a considerable part of the population in border adjacent areas made
their living by trafficking through the border. Thus, whole regions have
become criminal. During contraband activities till 1999 there was
considerable integration of Bulgarian, Serb and Macedonian organized
gangs. There is also a certain division of labor and sectors in
transborder traffic. The Macedonian guys dealt mainly with smuggling
goods and fuel, while the Albanians were into trafficking cigarettes,
drugs, cars and people.
Approximately in 1996-1997 the Balkan mafias got involved in
the traffic of women and it evolved as their basic activity (it might
have occurred earlier but it was the first time that some data have
been collected revealing this as business organized and controlled by
criminal groups). During 1997-2000 Macedonia was the first stage
of the traffic in women that was conducted mostly by Macedonian
Albanians. The whole western Macedonia is inhabited mainly by
ethnic Albanian population and there are a lot of cafØs where girls
for prostitution were provided. Some of these girls are further brought
to Greece or through Albania to Italy and Western Europe. Only in
1999 the Bulgarian border police has revealed 58 channels for the
traffic of people through Southwestern borders in 17 of which foreign
citizens were involved. 376 people have been engaged in these
channels and they attempted to illegally bring out of the country 1982
foreigners, 915 of which were women. The Bulgarian border police
has identified 32 persons that have been into the white slaves traffic.
23 of them were Bulgarians, 5 were Greeks, and 4 Macedonians. There
is enough evidence that Macedonian Albanians are among the basic
suppliers of women from Bulgaria, Romania and ex-Soviet republics
to the brothels in Italy, Greece and Cyprus. After the Kosovo crisis,
a great part of the girls forced to prostitute were moved from Western
Macedonia to Kosovo. After the escalation of the Macedonian crisis
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this trend rose. The traffic of women in Macedonia, Kosovo and
Albania is completely controlled by ethnic Albanians. The other major
activity of criminal Albanian groups is the traffic of illegal emigrants
and drugs to Italy completely controlled by families of Western
Albania. There is a lot of evidence for contacts of Albanian clans
with Ndrageta and Sicilian mafia.
Prior to the Kosovo crisis, Bulgarian mafia structures were rarely
involved in international drug trafficking passing through Bulgaria on
the so-called Balkan route. There were several reasons for this:
First, there was a little market space for drugs in Bulgaria 
according to informal data there are about 50 000-drug addicts in
Bulgaria. Bulgarian drug addicts are barely solvent enough to demand
more expensive narcotics like cocaine, for example.
The drugs market in Bulgaria has been traditionally controlled
by Arab tradesmen  Kurds, Syrians, Turkish, Iranians, Iraqis,
Lebanese etc. Due to these as well as to some other reasons, Bulgarian
mafia structures were generally involved only in guarding the freights
through Bulgaria or reloading and repackaging of greater freights at
special depots located mainly in the regions of Plovdiv, Sofia and
Varna. At present, Bulgaria is flooded with heroin and the price of
a single dose is ever decreasing. Here are some of the grounds for
this.
First, the Albanian mafia took over the control on the Balkan
route of drugs. Second, since 1998 Afghanistan released big amounts
of heroin, which were previously blocked in compliance with the
agreement with the US for financial assistance. Since, however,
Afghanistan did not receive such assistance, in retaliatory manner, it
poured drugs into Western Europe. Third, Bulgaria used to be transit
country only, but thats not the case any more. Owing to the low price
of heroin, the traffickers rather prefer to pay in kind in drugs that
are to be sold out on the Bulgarian market and thus reimburse their
money later on. This fact made dealers sell heroin at ever decreasing
price and multiply the demand for drugs among the youngsters.
Since the beginning of 1990s Albanian criminal groups tried
to occupy important positions in the traffic of heroin to Europe. It
was then that a large group from Kosovo immigrated in Turkey and
the Turkish drugs-mafia began using them as mules  drug
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traffickers on the Balkan route to Western Europe. Gradually,
shquips, as they are known in the underworld, gain yet more and
more territories and take control over substantial part of Turkish
mafias channels. According to analyses of various Western intelligence
agencies, at present the Albanian mafia controls about 75 % of heroin
supplies for Western Europe. How does it happen? What is typical
to the Albanian mafia is its similarity to the Sicilian mafia, the
Serb newspaper Glas yavnosti highlights. Albanians have particular
faith, specific language and rules, they uphold a well-established
family tradition and hierarchy. The bases of these drug-traffickers
are located in Skopje, Shkoder and Pristina. Kosovo itself is divided
into 10-12 drug clans, which maintain close contacts with their
fellows in Macedonia and, in practice, they act as a whole. In
Bulgaria this business is being run by no more than 4-5 criminal
groups. After the end of the Kosovo crisis, Bulgarian customs officers
began more frequently to arrest packages of heroin for Macedonia
and Kosovo, a trend that has not developed before. According to
most observers, the reason for this is that after establishing of KLA
as one of the mightiest organizations in Kosovo, the province has
become completely criminal and has turned into mafias land. The
number of arrested drug-traffickers of Albanian origin on Bulgarian
borders has increased twice in 2000 as compared to 1999 data. The
Report on National Security of Bulgaria in 2000 pointed out that
295 kg of heroin were seized on the routes to Kosovo and Macedonia.
During previous years the number of seized drug freights at the
border with Macedonia has been single digit. According to the
statistics, 15 % of the arrested drug-traffickers have been ethnic
Albanians. The security services that produced the Report estimate
that the profits of this type of activities are one of the funding sources
to radical Albanian organizations. Bulgarian citizens got involved in
Albanian traffic channels and Bulgaria turned into a depot for
temporary stockpiling and repackaging of drugs and precursors,
which engaged Bulgarian criminal groups in the structure of organized
drug criminality throughout the region. What occurs is the substantial
activation of the Southwestern drug route through Bulgaria, Macedonia,
Kosovo and Albania and the North direction of the Balkan route
through Romania, Moldova and Ukraine.
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THE MAFIAS LAND
The Head of the Hungarian Drug Combating Agency, Doerd Holoshi,
noted that 80 % of the heroin supplies in Hungary come through the
Kosovar Albanians channel. He also stated that the center of drug
traffic in Kosovo is Veliki Tarnovac. According to the Serbian Vice
Prime-Minister, Neboisa Covic, Veliki Tarnovac is a contraband center
in principle. There was smuggling of everything. Any kind of goods
was on sale there  starting from drugs, white slaves and arms,
ending to flour, sugar, butter and building materials.
Immediately after KLA took control over Kosovo when the crisis
ended, many Bulgarian carriers yet more frequently complained about
being stopped and blackmailed by armed men on the roads in Kosovo.
This specific extortion demonstrates that Kosovar criminal groups
exercise control over the supplies of any commodities entering the
territory of Kosovo. Through the practical secession of Kosovo from
the territory of Yugoslavia, the province turned into a new market
space run with deficit of everything and controlled by Kosovar
Albanians clans. The latter assumption is illustrated by the trend in
stealing vehicles in Bulgaria during the last two years. At the beginning
of 2000 there was a sharp rise in the stealing of high roadability
vehicles and vans. Data processing revealed that greater part of them
has been exported to Kosovo where they are especially needed due
to the scarce physical infrastructure and communications.
In order to demonstrate to what extent the mafia and civil servants
are one and the same thing it is worth mentioning the incident at
Gyueshevo checkpoint on the Bulgarian-Macedonian border a few
months ago where the Ambassador of Albania to Sofia was accused
of travelling in a stolen jeep, registered for seeking by INTERPOL.
As a whole, the integration of different Balkan criminal groups,
especially in the traffic of stolen motor vehicles, has been completed.
THE CRISIS IN MACEDONIA AS PROJECTION
OF GRAY BALKAN ECONOMY
Instability of the states on the Balkans is a major prerequisite for the
spread of organized crime. A week before the conflict in Tetovo
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(Macedonia) flared up, the prominent Balkan expert, the journalist
Misha Gleny, gave the following explanation of the forthcoming events:
Macedonia turned into a country governed by several families of
different size that accepted the legal image of political parties. One
can name at least five Macedonian and three Albanian families that
are competing for ever-diminishing resources. Unfortunately, the
structure of this system is a pyramidal one  the heads of families,
whether Macedonians or Albanians, are extremely rich, while the
remaining members of the families are quite poor. When disputes over
redistribution of economic resources emerge, regardless of being legal
or not, they always appear as disputes between families. And when
disputes become quite fierce, families get united on the basis of
ethnicity.
Therefore, it is not a casual incident that the conflict in Northern
Macedonia started at the very moment when the state endeavored to
set a border between Kosovo and Macedonia and to secure it. The
initial fighting began straight after setting the borderline near Tanusevci.
The same incidents occurred a year earlier when Serb authorities made
first efforts to put Presevo and Buyanovac valley under control. In
other words, Albanian criminal groups attempt to bring under the
ethnicity label every effort of the states in the region to set law and
order along the borders, because this directly threatens the traffic of
contraband goods that Albanians control. The investigations carried
out by the Macedonian police during the conflict in Tetovo and Shar
Mountain revealed that considerable amounts of weaponry stockpiled
in Albanians populated territories are under the control of Albanian
criminal groups. They try to enter into an open conflict even at the
expense of civilian casualties rather than putting up with stabilization
of the region which would gravely jeopardize their shadow activities,
economic and criminal interests.
The follow-up escalation and conflict spreading to Northern
Macedonia distinctly showed that it had been inspired by Kosovar
paramilitary establishments, which, beyond doubt, had been considered
a military part of the well-structured Albanian mafia. If not consid-
ering political claims of Macedonian Albanians and taking into account
solely their aspiration for participating in police and other state
authorities, what strikes is that the ultimate goal in fact is by assuming
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power to legitimize the ethnic prevalence along the border between
Kosovo and Macedonia. Thus acquiring considerable territories, Al-
banian criminal groups will keep control on the contraband channels
and traffic to Kosovo, Albania and Montenegro as a bridgehead to
Western Europe.
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CHAPTER IV
DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVES
IN SOUTHERN BALKANS
(BULGARIA  MACEDONIA  ALBANIA)
Plamen Ralchev
I. BACKGROUND
Southeastern Europe is located at strategic bridgehead for energy
transportation and distribution from Russia and the Caspian Sea to
Central and Western Europe. The transport and communication
opportunities of Southeastern Europe in the context of the larger East-
West and North-South corridors raise the economic value of the area.
Its strategic economic outreach to the Eastern Mediterranean, the
Middle East, the Black and the Caspian Seas, Russia, Ukraine,
Kazakhstan and to the Chinese market offers good opportunities for
private and government investment. The promising gas, oil, transport
and trade future of Turkey focuses a major US economic interest in
the Balkans. The importance of the energy and transport routes implies
the necessity for security arrangements in the broader area.
Southern Balkans: Raison dŒtre
The term Southern Balkans was launched and largely employed after
1995. It was initiated by Clinton administration for at least three
particular reasons.
1). After the Dayton Peace Accord the regime of Milosevic in
Belgrade still seemed to remain invulnerable.
2). It was by and large believed that Milosevic has not completed
his agenda yet. Thus, many envisaged a conflict spill-over process
to Kosovo and further to Macedonia.
3). The international embargo imposed on FR Yugoslavia signifi-
cantly hampered business transactions, especially referring to cargo
transport of goods from Western Europe to Asia Minor and backwards.
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The usual transport route via FR Yugoslavia could not be sufficiently
exploited.
At this background a new strategy matching the reasons listed
above was badly needed. The US administration tried a new approach
to manage the post-Yugoslav crises and to prevent new conflicts in
the Balkans. Thus, the term Southern Balkans and the concept of
security through cooperation and development were born. They
pursued short-term goals.
Initiating dialogue and cooperation among Bulgaria, Macedonia
and Albania was aimed at establishing a sanitary belt around the
southern side of FR Yugoslavia and preventing conflict spreading
to Macedonia, as well as promoting an alternative transport route
from Asia to Western Europe via Bulgaria, Macedonia and Albania.
Still political in its origin the US initiative desperately sought some
economic motivation. Therefore, it was complemented by a set of
projects mainly in the sphere of physical infrastructure development.
Some of them could be immediately short-listed: Corridor # 8 (a
road and railway connection from Bulgarian Black Sea port of
Bourgas through Macedonia to the Albanian Adriatic port of Vlora),
AMBO Oil pipeline project (following the route of Corridor # 8);
border crossing facilitation, etc. The US administration pledged full
support to all these projects. The US Trade and Development
Agency provided financial assistance for feasibility studies and
start-up activities.
WHAT HAVE PREVIOUS INITIATIVES ACCOMPLISHED?
The US initiative for Southern Balkans subregion-building was not
the only one targeted at Bulgaria, Macedonia and Albania though it
was particularly focused on those countries. In wider context, there
are some other initiatives for development, cooperation and conflict
prevention in the Balkans.
The following regional initiatives were supposed to influence the
process of shaping of the region of Southeastern Europe as a normal
European region:
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q   Balkan Conference on Stability, Security and Cooperation in
Southeastern Europe - a process that was started in July 1996
in Sofia, Bulgaria by the Foreign Ministers of the Balkan countries,
called the Sofia process; a bottom-up effort to develop the
region into a compatible part of Europe. It has practically
developed a Foreign Minister, Defence Minister and Heads of State
and Government formats. A very important product of the defense
aspect of the cooperation is the creation of the Multinational Peace
Force of Southeastern Europe (MPFSEE) - a multinational rapid
reaction force of Albania, Bulgaria, Macedonia, Greece, Italy,
Romania and Turkey. The Headquarters of the unit are in Plovdiv,
Bulgaria. The MPFSEE is operational from December 1999 and
closely cooperate with the PfP and NATO.
q  The Process for Stability and Goodneighborliness in South-
eastern Europe - The Royaumont Process - started on 13
December 1995 by the EU and aims the evolution of the civil
societies of the individual Balkan countries, the improvement of
the goodneighbourliness and the mutual information of the national
developments, the respect of human rights in the region. Apart
of the EU and the Balkan countries it includes also Russia,
Slovenia, the USA, the CE and the OSCE.
q   The Southeast European Cooperative Initiative (SECI) or The
Shifter Plan- launched on 6 December 1996 by the USA. It aims
at improving the transport infrastructure in the border check-points
of the Balkan countries, the attraction of private capital interests
and the evolution of a regional common market.
q  The Southern Balkans Development Initiative (SBDI) - a US
Government sponsored initiative of improving the transport infra-
structure between Albania, Macedonia and Bulgaria in 1995.
Coordination Group of the SBDI has been established and a series
of regular meetings has been held.
q  US-French Initiative to increase cooperation with Southeast
Europes emerging democracies on security matters, regional
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cooperation and economic development - an initiative spelled out
on 19 February 1999 by President Clinton and President Chirac
in Washington, DC. The conflicts in the Balkans have highlighted
the need to strengthen stability across Southeastern Europe. The
US-French initiative focus on an increased cooperation with
Southeast Europes emerging democracies on security matters;
coordination of security assistance to them from NATO countries;
promotion of regional cooperation and economic development.
q  After the Kosovo crisis the Stability Pact for South Eastern
Europe was elaborated as a comprehensive mechanism for pro-
moting the reconstruction and development of the region. Great
expectations were vested in this initiative mainly on behalf of the
countries in the region. Though very ambitious in its pre-set goals
and objectives the Stability Pact for the time being has not
managed to mobilize resources in providing financial assistance
to the bunch of pending projects.
For the purpose of assessing the relations and cooperation
between Bulgaria, Macedonia and Albania and their perspectives
it is worth highlighting the achievements of the SBDI, SECI and
the prospects for AMBO project implementation.
SOUTH BALKAN DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVE
The South Balkan Development Initiative (SBDI) is a $30 million
initiative which was announced by President Clinton in 1995. SBDI
is designed to help Albania, Bulgaria and Macedonia further develop
and integrate their transportation infrastructure along the east-west
corridor that connects them. The objectives of the initiative are
threefold: (i) to help the three countries upgrade their transportation
infrastructure in order to increase trade and stimulate economic
development; (ii) to encourage the three countries to develop a regional
approach to transport planning and use regional synergies to leverage
new public and private capital; and (iii) to use the specific experience
of regional cooperation on transport infrastructure development to
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foster more general regional cooperation and economic integration. The
U.S. Trade and Development Agency (TDA) is responsible for
implementing the initiative.
TDA provided support to public or private transportation sector
projects aimed at enhancing the connection among the three South
Balkan countries and promoting U.S. export opportunities.
In SBDIs early years, TDA was seeking immediate results though
the direct procurement of equipment and machinery to allow further
transportation infrastructure development. This procurement resulted
in the introduction of U.S. technologies in the SBDI countries and
demonstrated immediate tangible results from U.S. assistance. The
major objectives of SBDI will be realized in the long term, through
the implementation of larger projects.
The most typical use of TDA assistance funds is and will be
for the partial funding of feasibility studies. TDA will fund studies
for large projects which have commercial potential and which target
international financial institutions, bilateral donors, commercial banks,
or combination thereof as sources of financing for project implemen-
tation. Sometimes project planning assistance can be expanded beyond
a feasibility study to include the limited test deployment of equipment,
and TDA can selectively support these pilot projects.
As part of SBDI, the three countries established a South Balkan
Transportation Coordinating Group (CG). This group, composed
of senior transportation officials at the Deputy Minister level, coor-
dinates the overall development of the regions transportation sector
and oversees specific projects. The CG identifies projects and activities
for future funding. Through the CG, the USG hopes to leverage the
establishment of a well-organized regional process which will not only
ensure the effective management of major regional transportation
projects but also enhance overall sector efficiency and institutional
reform in the three countries. SBDI-funded transportation advisors
provide expert assistance to the CG at the project level. The advisors
help evaluate and identify projects for future funding under the SBDI.
To help with the procurement of equipment under the SBDI
grants, TDA provides procurement assistance services to Albania,
FYR Macedonia and Bulgaria. These services include assistance in
the preparation of equipment specifications, the preparation of tender
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documents, assistance to the grantee in tender evaluation, procurement
and delivery of equipment and machinery, and verification of all
equipment installation control and use through sound engineering
practices.
SBDI has focused primarily on the development of Trans-
European Corridor #8, from Burgas and Varna on the Black Sea to
Durres and Vlore on the Adriatic Sea. Increasingly, the South Balkan
countries and their regional neighbors have begun to view this East-
West Corridor as an intercontinental corridor  linking the Black and
Caspian Sea region with Western Europe.
SBDI Projects Supported by the United States Trade
and Development Agency:
SBDI REGIONAL PROJECTS
SBDI Regional Traffic Analysis Counting Equipment (9970016):
TDA has provided $1 million for the procurement of traffic analysis
counting equipment to be shared between Albania, Bulgaria and
Macedonia. The equipment would aid accurate traffic monitoring, safety,
maintenance and resource planning for Corridor 8, as well as strengthen
applications for financing road projects.
SBDI Regional Highway Mobile Laboratory Equipment (9970010):
TDA has provided $1 million for the procurement of highway mobile
laboratory equipment to be shared between Albania, Bulgaria and
Macedonia. The equipment is necessary to measure, test, and assure the
condition and quality of highway surfaces along Corridor 8, thereby
increasing the longevity of corridor highways.
East-West Corridor Economic Feasibility Study (96729): TDA has
provided $200,000 to partially fund a $300,000 feasibility study on the
east-west corridor between Albania, Macedonia and Bulgaria.
SBDI Financial Advisory Services (98736): Under the South Balkan
Development Initiative, TDA has provided financial advisory services to
the CG to identify a strategy and target investors and financiers for SBDI
project implementation.
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SBDI PROJECTS IN ALBANIA
Emergency Roads Repair Technical Assistance (200070010A): TDA
provided $70,000 to the General Roads Directorate to fund a technical
advisor to prepare engineering design and bid documents for road repair
projects in Albania.
Tamping Machine Procurement (200070001A): TDA provided $850,000
to procure a tamping machine for the Albanian Railways. The machine will
help the Albanian Railways maintain its 447-kilometer network of main lines.
Port of Durres Multimodal Container Facility Study (9970019B): TDA
provided $160,000 to fund the cost of goods and services required for a Phase
I feasibility study on the development of a potential multimodal container
facility at the Port of Durres. TDA has made available an additional $318,000
towards the completion of the studys second and final phase.
Rail Signaling System (9970015): TDA has committed to procure
approximately $1.6 million in rail signaling and related equipment for the
Albanian Railways. The equipment will help ensure the safety of trains and
automobiles that frequently cross railway lines, as well as allow more complex
railroad operations.
Rail Communications Equipment (9870042): TDA has committed to
procure approximately $1.6 million in rail communications equipment to
improve efficiency and safety along the East-West corridor rail routes in
Albania.
Road and Rail Construction Equipment (96724): TDA provided a $2.3
million grant to the Ministry of Transportation for the purchase of road and
rail construction equipment and machinery for reconstruction of the east-west
corridor between Durres-Tirana-Kafesan.
SBDI PROJECTS IN BULGARIA
Ground-Penetrating Radar (200070048A): TDA provided $107,270 to
the General Roads Administration to procure ground-penetrating radar; this
equipment will help assess the structural integrity of primarily roadways,
bridge decks and other large concrete structures.
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Tractor-Trailers for the Port of Varna (200070047A): TDA provided
$480,000 to procure tractor-trailers for the Black Sea Port of Varna; this
equipment will help expedite container traffic between the ports two locales.
Bridge Inspection Platform (200070046A): TDA provided the General
Roads Directorate $320,000 to procure a bridge inspection platform; this
equipment improves bridge safety inspections along Corridor 8.
Clearance Laser System (200070045A): TDA provided $300,000 to
the Bulgarian State Railways to procure a clearance laser system; this
equipment helps fast, high accuracy clearance measuring of railway tunnels
and provide a reliable data source for maintaining railroad structures.
Reach Stackers (9970038): TDA provided $780,000 to the Bulgarian
Ministry of Transport for the procurement of 2 reach stackers, which will
be used at the Port of Varna and the Sofia Intermodal Cargo Facility.
Diesel Locomotive Rehabilitation Facility Feasibility Study (9970009):
TDA signed a $250,000 grant with the Bulgarian State Railways to partially
fund a $375,182 feasibility study on a diesel locomotive rehabilitation
facility at Ruse.
Sofia Southern Highway By-Pass (9870067): TDA provided Bulgarias
General Road Administration $400,000 to fund a feasibility study on
developing a highway by-pass which would help alleviate traffic congestion
in Sofia and expedite traffic along Corridor 8.
Bulgarian Railways Commercialization Assistance (9870066): TDA
provided the Bulgarian Railways (BDZ) $290,000 for the partial funding
of $570,000 in technical assistance to the BDZ to develop and implement
a commercialization strategy.
Catenary Inspection and Maintenance Vehicle Project (98749): TDA
provided $1.35 million for the procurement of catenary inspection and
maintenance vehicle for the Bulgarian State Railways (BDZ) for use along
the East-West Corridor.
Port of Burgas Intermodal Container Terminal Study (98702): TDA
provided the Ministry of Transportation $300,000 for the partial funding
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of a $400,000 feasibility study on an intermodal container terminal at the
Port of Burgas.
Railroad Crossing Safety Panels Pilot Project (98707): TDA has
provided $296,050 to the Bulgarian State Railways (BDZ) to fund a project
involving the test deployment of rubberized, long-lasting railway crossing
safety panels at approximately fourteen sites in Bulgaria.
Sofia Intermodal Terminal Study (96725): TDA provided the Ministry
of Transportation $250,000 for the partial funding of a $500,000 feasibility
study on an intermodal container terminal in Sofia.
Railroad Equipment (96726): TDA provided a $2.3 million grant to
the Ministry of Transportation for the purchase of fiber optic cabling and
related station equipment for the rail section between Sofia and Gyueshevo.
SBDI PROJECTS IN MACEDONIA
Toll Roads Public-Private Partnership Project (200070006A) TDA
provided $200,000 to the Macedonian Ministry of Transport and
Communications for a Phase I feasibility study on establishing a public-
private partnership. Such a partnership would leverage limited public
funds to secure private financial support for the national roads sector.
Fiber Optic Cables and Telecommunications-Related Equipment
(199970071D) TDA provided $2,178,000 to the Macedonian Railways
to procure fiber optic cables and telecommunications-related equipment.
This equipment would provide the backbone for the railroads telecom-
munications system.
Railroad Level-Crossing Safety Devices (99-70085A) TDA provided
$1,225,000 to the Macedonian Railways to procure level-crossing safety
devices. These help ensure safety and steady traffic flows along the
railroad.
Railroad Design Software and Related Hardware (99-70083A) TDA
provided $74,556 to the Macedonian Railways to procure railroad design
software and computer equipment. This procurement helped the
Macedonian Railways plan and design railroad upgrades and expansion.
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Computer Systems Technical Assistance (9970012B): TDA is pro-
viding $60,000 in technical assistance to the Macedonian Railways (MZ).
This assistance would define specifications for an upgraded computer
system that would be Y2K compliant.
Locomotive Spare Parts and Overhaul Parts (98705): TDA provided
a $1.6 million and $950,000 grant to Macedonian Railways (MZ) for
the procurement of locomotive spare parts to increase capacity of the
locomotive fleet by 50 percent.
Skopje Intermodal Container Terminal (96735): TDA is providing
$150,000 towards the cost of a $300,000 feasibility study on an intermodal
container terminal in Skopje.
Road Equipment (96728): TDA provided a $1.7 million grant to the
Ministry of Transportation for the purchase of road construction equipment
for the Kriva Palanka-Psacha road segment.
Rail Sector Feasibility Study (96727): TDA provided a $300,000
grant for a feasibility study on the economic viability of Macedonias
rail sector.
Source: United States Trade and Development Agency
(www.tda.gov/region/sbdi.html)
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SOUTH EASTERN EUROPE COOPERATION INITIATIVE
South Eastern Europe Cooperation Initiative was designed and
elaborated as a forum in which representatives of the participating
states meet to discuss common regional economic and environ-
mental problems. The initiative calls for concerted action and takes
into account region-wide plans for dealing with problems con-
cerned. Meetings of representatives is followed promptly by the
convening of ad hoc working groups of technical experts, who
are responsible for the development of concrete proposals.
SECI employs the model of working meetings on a group of
topics: Trade and Transport Facilitation, Regional Road Transport,
Transborder Crime, Electricity Grids, Securities Markets, Energy
Efficiency, Environmental Recovery, Transport Infrastructure, Re-
gional Regulation of New Communications and Information Tech-
nologies. Within each of these topics some programs operate.
The Trade and Transport Facilitation in Southeast Europe
Program (TTFSE) fosters trade by promoting more efficient and
less costly trade flows across the countries in Southeast Europe
and provides European Union-compatible customs standards. The
program seeks to reduce non-tariff costs to trade and transport,
reduce smuggling and corruption at border crossings, and strengthen
and modernize the customs administrations and other border
control agencies. The initial participants in the program include
Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia,
and Romania. Moldova and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
have recently joined the Program. The program is a result of the
collaborative efforts of the national governments in the region,
the World Bank, and the United States in collaboration with the
European Union.
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AMBO (Trans-Balkan Pipeline Project)
AMBO is a joint Bulgarian-Macedonian-Albanian company, based in
the US, which endeavors to develop a 570-mile crude oil pipeline from
the Bulgarian Black Sea port of Burgas across Bulgaria, Macedonia
and Albania to the Adriatic Sea port of Vlora. Oil originating in
Southern Russia and Central Asia that has been transported to the
Black Sea via pipelines to the Russian port of Novorossiysk and
Tuapse; the Georgian ports of Supsa and Batumi would be shuttled
via tankers across the Black Sea to the port of Burgas.
Expected increases in oil flows into the Black Sea via these ports
will quickly surpass the safe capacity of the Bosphorus as a shipping
lane for such oil. Given the cost of loading and offloading tankers
in the Black Sea versus transiting the Bosphorus, the costs of the
AMBO pipeline would be offset by the economic advantages of VLCC
loaded at Vlora. Successive governments, since 1994, from all three
Balkan countries have given their full written approval and support
for this project. From their prospective the revenues from the AMBO
pipeline would generate significant new income flows and provide the
governments with direct investment opportunities in their own econo-
mies. It should also advance the privatization aspirations of the US
government in the region by providing work opportunities for new
industries in support of the maintenance of the pipeline and the
downstream industries of oil refining.
This 36-inch diameter pipeline has a nominal throughput
capability of 750,000 barrels per day. The resulting USD billion
dollar pipeline will become a part of the regions critical East-
West Corridor 8 infrastructure, which includes highway, railway,
gas, and fiber-optic telecommunications lines. This transportation
corridor was approved by the Transport Ministers of the European
Union in April 1994 and has been aggressively supported by the
United States Government through its South Balkan Development
Initiative. Additional support has been received through the
European Unions PHARE program and through the British,
French, and German Governments. The East-West corridor begins
in the Ports of Varna and Bourgas on the Black Sea; crosses
SECURITY CHALLENGES AND DEVELOPMENT OF SOUTHERN BALKANS 81
through Bulgaria, Macedonia, and Albania; and ends in the
Albanian ports of Durres and Vlora.
By providing for the daily delivery of 750,000 barrels of crude
oil to the port of Vlora, this strategic transnational infrastructure
project has several important implications on international markets:
q It will give European nations access to a significant alternative
source of crude oil.
q It will provide a consistent source of crude oil to American
refineries along the East Coast at a time when more than half
of the oil required by the United States is imported through foreign
markets.
q It will build a foundation for healthier economies through the
Balkans and facilitate rapid integration of those nations with
Western Europe.
q It will permit governments in the Caspian Sea region to employ
long-term planning to achieve the enormous economic potential
associated with these new fields in the region.
q It will provide American companies with a key role in developing
the vital East-West Corridor.
The implementation of the AMBO Pipeline Project relies upon
the decision that is to be taken by Chevron-Texaco and Exxon-Mobile.
These two corporations own the greater part of Tengiz oil field in
Kazakhstan and they are major shareholders in the Caspian Pipeline
Consortium supplying oil to the Black Sea Terminal Novorossiysk 2.
According to some estimates however, the final judgement of the two
leading companies on AMBO Project will hardly be taken within the
next two years.
Both the AMBO Project, which is heavily dependent on Cau-
casian and Caspian basin crude oil supplies, and Transeuropean
Corridor VIII make sense provided that they are regarded in correlation
with two other initiatives  TRACECA and INOGATE program.
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TRACECA
The TRACECA Program (Transport System Europe-Caucasus-Asia,
informally known as the Great Silk Road) was launched at a
European Union (EU) conference in 1993. The EU conference
brought together trade and transport ministers from the Central
Asian and Caucasian republics to initiate a transport corridor on
an West-East axis from Europe, across the Black Sea, through the
Caucasus and the Caspian Sea to Central Asia. In September 1998,
twelve countries (including Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Kazakhstan,
Romania, Turkey and Uzbekistan) signed a multilateral agreement
known as the Baku Declaration to develop the transport corridor
through closer economic integration of member countries, rehabili-
tation and development of new transportation infrastructure, and by
fostering stability and trust in the region. In addition, the EU has
sponsored the INOGATE program, which appraises oil and gas
exports routes from Central Asia and the Caspian, and routes for
shipping energy to Europe. INOGATE is run through the EUs
TACIS program.
The TRACECA program has resulted in closer co-operation
and dialogue among government authorities, which has led to
agreements to keep transit fees at competitive levels, and efforts
to simplify border-crossing formalities. There have also been
agreements to ship large volumes of cargo along the TRACECA
corridor, recognizing that this route is the shortest and potentially
the fastest and cheapest route from Central Asia to deep-water ports
linked with world markets.
The east-west corridor from Central Asia through the Caucasus
into the Black Sea, and their linking with the TENs and other
worldwide destinations, is a physically functioning reality, carrying
substantial cargo. The integration and harmonization of the regions
transport regulatory environment with European and international
norms is an on-going process. TRACECA is the principal vector
of the European, and indeed of other international agencies, for the
introduction of practices to reduce non-physical barriers to the
movement of goods.
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II. HANDICAPS
The US strategy for Southern Balkans subregion building faced some
difficulties.
1). Lack of previous communication
and cooperation experience between Bulgaria,
Macedonia and Albania
In geopolitical aspect, Bulgaria, Macedonia and Albania for
many decades stayed on different sides of the Cold War bloc
division. The lack of communication and cooperation in broader
sense determined the economic backwardness of the region.
The very notion of development appears to be quite challeng-
ing for the countries constituting the so-called strategic tier of
Southern Balkans. The intensification of contacts started after
1992 with the separation of Macedonia from Yugoslavia. Bulgaria
was the first to acknowledge the independence of the new
sovereign state. It was since then that a new type of relations was
initiated though some deeply rooted historically inherited stereo-
types and prejudices have hampered this process.
2). Insufficient funding for projects implementation
The major funding sources for infrastructure projects imple-
mentation have been provided mainly within SBDI by the US
Trade and Development Agency. TDA provided assistance amount-
ing to some USD 30 million for Bulgaria, Macedonia and Albania
for the implementation of 40 projects related to feasibility and
technical pre-investment studies as well as for equipment procure-
ment. Yet, the realization of the Sofia  Skopje railway section
of TEN Corridor # 8 is estimated at USD 100 million. The whole
construction of TEN Corridor # 8 from Burgas to Durres/ Vlora
will cost EURO 2.55 billion. The three countries concerned expect
to get funding from the EU pre-accession funds.
3). Landscape impediments
The mountainous terrain of Southern Balkans, especially the
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part in Macedonia and Albania further hampers the realization of
transport corridor. Bulgaria has made significant progress in the
construction works on its territory, both highway and railway
sections. However the advance in Macedonia and Albania is in
impasse due to the harsh landscape, which requires complex of
tunnels and bridges.
4). The Kosovo crisis
The international sanctions imposed on Yugoslavia and the
Kosovo crisis in 1999 catalyzed the expectations of establishing
alternative bypass to Western Europe through Macedonia and
Albania. It has been perceived as politically conducive means for
curbing and containing the influence of Milosevics regime and
preventing the conflict spill-over further to Macedonia.
5). Political changes in Belgrade
After Milosevics ousting from power FR Yugoslavia regained
its strategic priorities of hosting the most convenient transport link
from Asia Minor to Western Europe. The economic justification
seriously favors those routes passing through FR Yugoslavia. This
fact badly affects Yugoslavias neighbors  Macedonia and Al-
bania, in particular. First and foremost, it seriously shatters the
grounds for raison detre of Southern Balkan subregion and
underscores the emblematic Corridor # 8. The expected funding
for post-conflict rehabilitation of FR Yugoslavia would further opt
for transport corridors via Serbia at the expense of the route along
Corridor # 8.
6). The crisis in Macedonia
Notwithstanding the anticipated conflict potential of
Macedonia, the escalation of the crisis eventually was not pre-
vented. The violent outburst of hostilities in Northern and Western
Macedonia in early 2001 gravely questioned the integrity of the
state, let alone the concept of security through development.
Becoming a zone of insecurity, it irreversibly deteriorated the
business and investment climate in Macedonia. The lack of
legitimate control on significant part of the Macedonian state
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consequently depreciated the prospects for development of Cor-
ridor # 8 and the AMBO project. Besides the transport corridors
competing with Corridor # 8, there are also competing routes to
the projected AMBO Pipeline. Three other projects qualify for
transporting Russian and Caspian oil  Baku-Ceyhan Pipeline,
Konstanca-Omisalji Pipeline and Burgas-Alexandroupolis Pipeline.
Amongst the three of them, considering Bulgarias interests, only
the pipeline from the Bulgarian port of Burgas to the Greek port
of Alexandroupolis matters. The length of this pipeline is about
280 km and the costs are estimated at USD 650-700 million. This
project is considerably cheaper and much more feasible than the
AMBO pipeline, which, given the high political risk in Macedonia,
will barely attract investments for its implementation.
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III. PRESENT SITUATION
Bulgarias Trade and Economic Relations
with Macedonia and Albania
The relations of Bulgaria with Macedonia and Albania prior to
the 90s lacked any practical experience due to the different positions
these countries had obtained in the Cold War world order. It was since
the beginning of the 90s that the countries in focus endeavored to
establish a new type of relations.
In practical terms, the trade relations between Bulgaria and
Macedonia are well illustrated by the following official data:
Balance of Trade: Bulgaria  Macedonia (million USD)
In 1998 Macedonia was third among the Balkan trading partners of
Bulgaria (the first and second were Greece and Turkey, respectively)
and 14th in the whole list of Bulgarias foreign trading partners. In
1999 Macedonia took 4th place among Bulgarias Balkan trading
partners (after Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia) and 15th in the whole
foreign trade list of Bulgaria. In 2000 Macedonia is sixth among
Balkan trading partners of Bulgaria and 17th in the overall trading
partners list.
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 I-VI 2001
Export 143,8 97,4 97,8 105,1 110,3 55,5
Import 30,3 26,1 37,9 24,3 25,8 9,8
Balance +113,5 +71,2 +59,9 +80,8 +84,5 +45,8
Total 174,1 123,4 135,7 129,3 136,1 65,3
Source: Ministry of Economy of the Republic of Bulgaria
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Balance of Trade: Bulgaria  Albania (million USD)
The data above illustrate that despite the decreased volume of
trade operations between Bulgaria and Albania in recent years there
is a consistent/ steady trend of forming considerable positive balance
of trade for Bulgaria. The balance is positive in 1999 and compared
to the previous year data there is an increase of USD 7,956 million
mainly due to the increased by 32% export. Compared to the previous
year there is slight decrease in the trade by about 36 % resulting from
fewer Bulgarian export and increased Albanian import.
Bulgaria is one of the major foreign trading partners of Albania
and it is fourth in the Albanias foreign trading partners list after
Italy, Greece and Germany. Considering the foreign trade of Bulgaria
with the Balkan countries from 1997 till 2000 Albania holds the 8th
position.
For the purpose of promoting and coordinating bilateral relations
since February 1999 a joint Bulgarian-Albanian intergovernmental
committee on trade and economic cooperation. The Committee is
headed by the Bulgarian and Albanian Ministers of transportation. It
is also envisaged a trilateral Committee (including Macedonia) to be
established for fostering combined transportation services along
Transeuropean Corridor VIII.
Besides being a transit country for energy resources, Bulgarias
position of energy hub also implies to its capacity of playing a leading
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 I-VI 2001
Export 37. 9 50. 6 58. 9 41. 7 22. 4 24. 9 32. 8 23.981 9,054
Import 0. 4 1. 5 0. 3 0. 1 0.09 0.09 0.03 0,07 0,043
Total 38. 3 52. 1 59. 2 41. 8 22. 49 24. 99 32. 83 24.051 9,098
Balance +37. 5 +49. 1 +58. 6 +41. 6 +22. 31 +24. 81 +32. 77 +23.91 +9,011
Source: Ministry of Economy of the Republic of Bulgaria
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role in the Balkan energy market since it is a principal producer and
exporter of electricity to neighboring Balkan countries. In this regard,
the capacity of the transmission lines for exporting electricity to
Macedonia and Albania needs further advancement.
Some of the key infrastructure projects related to Bulgaria,
Macedonia and Albania are listed below:
Sector Country Project Name Project Description Total Cost Status and Comments
(EUR mln)
ROADS Albania Lushnje-Fier North-South, Corridor VIII, 15 Study available
2-lane road
construction, 32 km
Fier-Vlora North-South, Corridor VIII, 23 Project delayed by land
2-lane road acquisition and institutional
construction, 34 km  issues.
Tepelene-Gjirorokaster North-South,2-lane road 26
construction, 24 km
Pogradec-Korce East-West, Corridor VIII, 19
2-lane road
construction, 40 km
Elbasan-Librazdh East-West, Corridor VIII, 14 EBRD loan signed
2-lane road
construction, 31 km
Durres-Kukes Emergency repairs 15 World Bank loan signed
(access to Kosovo) and pavement
strengthening on 221 km 24
Shkoder-Lezhe North-South Corridor,
2-lane road construction, 43 km 25
Qafe Thane-Pogradec East-West Corridor,
2-lane road construction, 21 km
Road maintenance Improvement of road 47
maintenance management
Tirana airport road New 2-lane road 5
construction, 5 km
Hani Hotit (Montenegro North-South Corridor, 23
border)-Shkoder 2-lane road construction, 35 km
Fier-Tepelene North-South Corridor, No study available
2-lane road construction, 85 km
Tirana ring road New road construction
Tirana-Elbasan Road rehabilitation Study to be launched
Bulgaria Sofia South Bypass East-West Corridor VIII, US TDA study
Ihtiman - Radomir 2-lane highway, 100 km
Macedonia Skopje bypass East-West Corridor VIII, 50 EIB loan
new 4-lane road
construction, 23 km
Stracin-Kriva Palanka East-West Corridor VIII, 35 No study available
2-lane road reconstruction, 27 km
SECURITY CHALLENGES AND DEVELOPMENT OF SOUTHERN BALKANS 89
Source: European Investment Bank (www.eib.org/lending/balkan)
Struga-Kafasan Easr-West Corridor VIII, No study available
(Albanian border) 2-lane road
reconstruction, 6 km
Makasi-Resen-Ohrid East-West Corridor VIII, Study available
road reconstruction, 37 km
RAILWAYS Albania Rail connection East-West Corridor VIII,
with Macedonia new single-track, 3 km
Bulgaria Radomir-Gyueshevo East-West Corridor VIII,
reconstruction, 88 km
Karnobat-Sindel East-West Corridor VIII,
doubling and
electrification, 123 km
Macedonia Kumanovo-Deve Bair East-West Corridor VIII, Feasibility study required
single-track railway line
construction, 85 km
Kicevo-Albanian border East-West Corridor VIII, Feasibility study required
single-track railway line
construction, 35 km
PORTS Albania Port of Durres Further rehabilitation 20
rehabilitation of quays and storage
facilities
Port of Vlora Upgrade to minimum Existing feasibility
standards study
AIRPORTS Albania Tirana airport pass, Rehabilitation/ extension 15
terminal and ATC of existing terminal/
air traffic control
Bulgaria Sofia airport development New passenger terminal and 150 Tendering launched
rehabilitation of runway
Macedonia Skopje airport Extension of airport facilities 40 Studies under way
ELECTRICITY Albania Zemlak-Bitola (Mac.) H.T. Transmission line 25 km No study available
400 kV in Albania, total length 75 km
Burrel-Vrutok H.T Transmission line, 50 km. US TDA study
(Macedonia) 220 kV In Albania, total length 98 km
Bulgaria Dubrovo (Mac.)- H.T. Transmission line, 20 Detailed options study
Blagoevgrad 400 kV 80 km in Bulgaria, required
total length 190 km
Macedonia Dubrovo-Blagoevgrad H.T. Transmission line, 70 Detailed study required
(Bulgaria) 400 kV 110 km in Macedonia,
total length 190 km
Zemlak (Albania)-Bitola H.T. Transmission line, No study available
400 kV 50 km in Macedonia,
total length 75 km
Burrel (Albania)-Vrutok, H.T.Transmission line, US TDA study
220 kV 48 km in Macedonia,
total length 98 km
GAS, OIL Albania Burgas-Vlora Oil Pipeline Caspian Sea-Western Reference to AMBO
Europe oil route Project/ US TDA study
Macedonia Burgas (Bulgaria) – Vlora Caspian Sea-Western Reference to AMBO
(Albania) Oil Pipeline Europe oil route Project/ US TDA study
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Prospects for development of trilateral relations
q Promoting trade opportunities by conducting business meet-
ings of representatives of both countries; organizing business
forums in Sofia, Skopje and Tirana
q Reciprocal participation in fairs and exhibitions held in these
countries
q Exchange of information for participation in privatization
tenders and opportunities for direct investments in
tourism
q Joint participation in common projects supported by the
EU and other international institutions.
CONCLUSION
The development perspectives at subregional level of relations including
Bulgaria, Macedonia and Albania used to be projected mainly within
the Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe, SECI, SBDI and some other
bilateral and multilateral regional initiatives. The ultimate goal is to
promote them as a security policy factor in the region. Though quite
ambitious most of the commenced projects stay at the level of feasibility
studies. The Stability Pact as a new type of comprehensive mechanism
of large scope and regional impact dramatically failed to meet the
expectations that were initially vested in it due to its incapacity to
mobilize efforts and resources for implementing its ambitious goals.
The attempts at developing economic cooperation among Bulgaria,
Macedonia and Albania go along with the efforts for stabilization,
rehabilitation and development of Southeastern Europe. Nonetheless, the
promotion of such initiatives remains solely within the capacity of the
three countries in focus. Since there are quite few instruments for
promoting these efforts, Bulgaria, Macedonia and Albania may rely
upon some EU development programs, such as PHARE and INTERREG,
utilizing them for common integrated goals. A special emphasis in this
regard should be put on fostering communications by implementing a
set of physical infrastructure projects that are to integrate the region
within the European mainstream.
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CONCLUSION
Dr. Ognyan Minchev
We have been deliberating for years about the necessity and opportunity
for cooperation in the region at economic level, at civic level, in the fields
of culture and all basic aspects of life. And we see how difficult it is to
accomplish real practical acts of cooperation in all these fields. One of
the reasons is the fact that organized crime networks have international-
ized and effectively implemented cooperation schemes among themselves.
Therefore, any effort on behalf of our weak states to implement particu-
lar contracts or particular schemes of cooperation are facing the chal-
lenge of the realities that those organized crime networks flourishing in
the region as throughout the entire post-communist world are posing in
front of this cooperation.
We want to have more integrated trade system, but in order to achieve
this goal we have to lift particular customs duties, particular bureaucratic
thresholds on the borders and so on and so forth. Lifting them for descent
business activities we are lifting them also for the mafia networks which
are much stronger and much more effective in implementing trans-bor-
der cooperation in their own style. The same applies to all those plans for
creating an integrated commercial and financial territory in the Balkans
or in particular in Southern Balkans in which it would be much easier in
terms of legislation, financial mechanisms, and all basic regulatory prac-
tices to exchange economic goods and economic fortunes.
All those efforts, known lately as Soros plan within the Stability
pact, are facing difficulties emerging from the strong challenge of those
illegal criminal networks. Most countries in the region prefer to have
their own national strategies for reducing or controlling organized crime
and trans-border free-of-control exchange rather than going into a larger
space of economic and institutional cooperation and not be able to con-
trol the processes on their own territory.
So, we are stuck in a situation in which the expansion of the orga-
nized crime networks is reducing our chances for decent cooperation
among ourselves. This kind of cooperation is the basic instrument through
which we can apply for membership into the European Union, in the
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Common European space. Whatever efforts different countries may make,
whatever achievements they may have, even up to the individual mem-
bership into the European Union, the real benefits of the European Union
for us will come at the point in which the Balkans will be transformed
into an integrated part of the common European space.
The basic problem is how we can compete with the speed and the
effectiveness of the illegal networks expansion, how we can reduce them,
control them, contain them and therefore give chance for the descent co-
operation in the Balkan region.
Emphasizing the essence of the Security Challenges and Develop-
ment of Southern Balkans Project, we would like to figure out not just
what the potential security challenges for the three countries  Bulgaria,
Macedonia and Albania, might be, but furthermore formulate the real
background for future cooperation among these countries.
Why does it matter? One of the basic reasons is that the develop-
ment processes in the region after 1912 have been conducted in the north-
south direction. This made Bulgaria and Albania marginal from the in-
ternational system that existed on the Balkans between 1912 and 1989.
Macedonia was not present at all as an independent country in this sys-
tem.
Now we attempt to create a new system. It is important whether we
will allow this new system to reproduce the monopoly structure of north-
south cooperation or we will try to build a balancing dimension of coop-
eration, which is the cooperation between east and west on the Balkans,
or in the Southern Balkans at least.
The cooperation between Bulgaria, Albania and Macedonia is a cru-
cial issue not only in regard to economy and security but it is also a
turning point for implementing the real value of our states and communi-
ties in the diverse world in the beginning of 21st century.
The strategy of our cooperation involves several most important pri-
orities, inter-linked within the logic of our integrated national interests.
First, we need to focus on the development of our national institutions at
the quality level of Europe of the 21st century. Strong and stable repre-
sentative democracy, supported by effective public administrative sys-
tems is the basic prerequisite to control and narrow the space of orga-
nized crime and its control over the national economies and the economic
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partnership among us. The effective rule of law is the only background
for effective cooperation among the three countries. Second, we need to
define the important fields and programs of our cooperation, serving the
national interests of the three countries. Corridor # 8 and the AMBO
pipeline from Bourgas to Vlore are the backbone of an effective regional
partnership and development in the East  West strategic dimension in
the Southern Balkans. Third, we need to think and plan our national
interest and development within the context of our mutual dependence
and partnership. On the Balkans, were used to strategies of a zero sum
game type  if you win, I lose, and vice versa. This phenomenon makes
our national plans for infrastructure and economic development mutually
exclusive and counter-productive.
Last but not least, we need to join efforts in containing and prevent-
ing all potential conflicts on our soil, and on the soil of our neighbors,
based on ethnic or any other communal differences. Destabilization of
the type weve seen in Macedonia in 2001 is a powerful factor of all our
countries strategic and economic self-isolation on the eve of the most
important security and economic transformation process in Europe to-
day  the NATO and the EU enlargement. If we miss this wave of inte-
gration and remain a powerless periphery out of new Europe, we could
blame only ourselves for such a repeating misfortune.
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